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Thesis advisor(s) Professor Sami Torstila  
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Abstract: The purpose of this thesis is to address the lack of understanding of drivers behind capital 
commitments into buyout (BO) funds. According to my knowledge, this is one of the first studies to 
solely focus on the drivers of buyout fundraising and moreover the first to show that capital 
commitments into buyout funds are driven by credit market conditions; when credit market 
conditions are loose more funds are raised and more money is committed to a particular fund. 
I obtain a comprehensive sample of European and North American buyout funds from two different 
sources. Through Thomson VentureXpert (VE), I access the information of 5,420 buyout funds 
raised during 1980-2011 and from Preqin, I obtain the data of 1,273 buyout funds. VE is widely 
used among academics and thus a reliable source for an aggregate country and a firm level analysis. 
Preqin is a fairly new database and employed only by the most recent studies, thus giving access to 
a fairly new source of data for a fund-level analysis. 
My results indicate that a 100 basis points decrease in the credit spread leads to a US$47billion 
aggregate increase in commitments to buyout funds in the following year. The significant increase 
in the aggregate buyout fundraising volume is due to an increase in the fund size by follow-on funds 
and higher number of first-time funds being raised. A 100bps decrease in the credit spread increases 
the number of first-time buyout funds by 12
1
 in the following year and the size of a follow-on fund 
raised by an established private equity (PE) firm increases by 17%, when the credit spread 
decreases by 100bps.  
Also, the probability of a PE firm raising a follow-on fund is affected by the prevailing credit 
market conditions. A decrease of 100bps in the credit spread increases the probability of raising a  
fund by 5% across the industry; however, when controlling for the performance of a previous fund 
for an established GP, the probability diminishes to 1.3%.  
Finally, I end my study by comparing the performance characteristics of buyout funds to the 
existing literature on venture capital funds. I conclude that even though macro-economic drivers 
behind capital commitments into buyout funds differ from venture capital funds, the micro-level 
drivers of fund performance are the same. Across the industry larger funds earn lower returns, 
however a particular GP earns larger returns with larger funds; but the effect diminishes away at a 
very large fund size. 
Keywords  Buyout funds, fundraising, credit market conditions 
                                              
1
 In the sample, 12 presents on average 20% of the new funds entering the buyout industry every year. 
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ABSTRAKTI 
Tekijä  Katrin Vatiska  
Työn nimi  Buyout-rahastojen varainkeruuseen vaikuttavat tekijät: Luottomarkkinat vaikuttavana 
tekijänä sijoituksien määrään 
Tutkinto  Kauppatieteiden maisteri 
Koulutusohjelma  Rahoitus 
Työn ohjaaja(t)  Professori Sami Torstila  
Hyväksymisvuosi  2014 Sivumäärä  79 Kieli  Englanti 
Tutkielman tavoitteena on tuottaa uutta tutkimustietoa buyout-rahastojen varainkeruusta. Parhaan 
tietämykseni mukaan tämä tutkielma on ensimmäisiä buyout-rahastoihin yksinomaan keskittyviä. 
Tutkimuksen tarkoituksena on osoittaa, että luottomarkkinoiden olosuhteet vaikuttavat buyout-
rahastojen sijoituksiin; kun luottomarkkinat ovat löysät ja korot ovat alhaalla niin useampi buyout-
rahasto ryhtyy varainkeruun ja enemmän rahaa sijoitetaan buyout-rahastoihin.  
 
Tutkimuksen aineisto koostuu eurooppalaisista ja pohjois-amerikkalaisista buyout-rahastoista, 
joiden tiedot olen kerännyt kahdesta eri lähteestä. Olen Thomson VentureXpert (VE) kautta 
kerännyt 5,420 rahaston tiedot aikaväliltä 1980-2011 ja Preqinnin kautta 1,273 buyout-rahaston 
tiedot. VE:tä on käytetty paljon aiemmissa tutkimuksissa ja siksi se on luotettava lähde maa- ja 
yrityskohtaiseen analyysiin. Preqin on suhteellisen uusi  tietokanta ja sitä on käytetty vain 
uusimmissa tutkimuksissa, täten antaen uuden tietolähteen rahastokohtaiseen analyysiin.  
 
Tulokset osoittavat, että kun markkinaluottokorko laskee yhden prosenttiyksikön, niin sijoitukset 
buyout-rahastoihin kasvavat noin US$47 miljardilla. Tämä merkittävä kasvu sijoituksien määrässä 
johtuu sekä jatko-rahaston koon kasvusta jo perustetuissa pääomayrityksissä sekä siitä että 
perustetaan useampia pääomayrityksiä , jotka keräävät ensimmäisen rahastonsa. Lähemmin, yhden 
prosenttiyksikön lasku markkinaluottokorossa johtaa kahdentoista uuden, ensikertalaisen, rahaston 
keräämiseen ja jo perustetun pääomayrityksen jatko-rahaston koon kasvuun 17 prosentilla. 
 
Lisäksi tutkin myös todennäköisyyttä millä jo perustetut pääomayritykset keräävät jatkorahastonsa. 
Tulosten mukaan löysä markkinaluottokorko nostaa tilastollisesti merkittävästi todennäkoisyyttä 
sille, että jatkorahasto kerätään, vaikkakin tulokset eivat ole taloudellisesti merkittäviä. Kun 
markkinaluottokorko laskee yhden prosenttiyksikön niin todennäköisyys sille että pääomayritykset 
keräävät buyout-rahaston nousee 5 prosentilla, kun otamme huomioon yrityskohtaiset tekijät, kuten 
edellisen rahaston tuoton, niin yrityksen todennäköisyys kasvaa vain 1.3 prosentilla.  
 
Lopuksi vertaan buyout-rahastojen tuottoja venture capital rahastojen tuottoihin perustuen 
aiempaan kirjallisuuteen. Buyout-rahastoilla ja venture capital rahastoilla on eri varainkerun 
määrään vaikuttavat makrotaloudelliset tekijät, kun taas rahastokohtaiset, mikrotason tekijät sen 
sijaan ovat hyvin samanlaiset. Molemmille rahastotyypeille pätee että kooltaan suuremmilla 
rahastoilla on matalammat tuotot, kuitenkin jos otamme yrityskohtaiset tekijät huomioon, kuten 
edellisen rahaston tuoton, niin yritys parantaa tuottoa kun rahaston koko kasvaa.  
Avainsanat  Buyout-rahastot, varainkeruu, luottomarkkinoiden olosuhteet 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background and motivation 
In the early 1980s, the annual commitments to buyout funds were around US$1billion
2
, while 
today the commitments have grown to nearly US$165 billion
3
. The buyout market has gained 
significant importance as a financial market, however the buyout fundraising has received 
surprisingly little attention from academics compared to venture capital funds which have 
significantly less capital under management worldwide
4
. 
The buyout fundraising market is featured with cyclicality and clustering in time. Currently, 
we are undergoing third private equity wave which was largely triggered by loose credit 
markets and birth of collateralized debt obligations, which brought more liquidity to the 
markets (Shivdasani and Wang, 2011). The first buyout wave in the late 1980s was fuelled by 
the birth of junk bond market in 1985 and the second wave occurred during the dot-com boom 
in the late 1990s (Kaplan and Stein, 1993 and Axelson et al, 2010). In addition to these credit 
market related occurrences, a little is known about the dynamics of capital commitment into 
buyout funds. 
To my best knowledge, this paper is the first one trying show that capital commitments into 
buyout funds are driven by credit market conditions; when credit market conditions are loose 
more funds are raised and more money is committed to a particular fund. Moreover, I identify 
the macro and micro factors that drive the buyout fundraising and assess the economy-wide 
importance of these factors. I run comprehensive analyses on country-, firm- and fund-level 
intending to show the relation between credit market conditions and aggregate buyout 
fundraising volume, number of first-time buyout funds entering the market, likelihood of 
raising a fund, fund size and performance.  
                                              
2
 The buyout fundraising figures are based on Thomson VentureXpert database and a sample period of 1980-
2011. The figures exclude certain type of buyout funds for the purposes of this study, however, equally 
applicable for the whole period. See section 5.1 for more details of the exclusion criteria. The figures are 
inflation adjusted and represented as equivalent to 2011 dollars. $165 billion refers to 2011. 
3
 $165 billion refers to 2011 
4
 According to Metrick and Yasuda (2010) buyout funds have 60% of total private equity assets under 
management. 
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According to capital structure theories such as mispricing theory and agency conflict theory 
the leverage used in buyout transactions in driven more significantly by time-series variation 
than by the target firm characteristics (Axelson et al, 2010). The strategy of buyout funds is to 
use substantial level of leverage in acquisitions to finance the transaction as well as to boost 
the returns of the equity committed by investors. Thus, one of the key elements when 
assessing the attractiveness of a target is the state of credit markets; the ease of accessibility to 
debt financing and the current cost of debt. Adjusted present value theory suggests that private 
equity managers valuing the targets should price a firm according to its fundamental value 
adjusted with financial side-effects such as tax benefits of debt (Axelson et al, 2009). When 
credit market conditions are loose and access to debt is easy, financing of a deal is more 
viable. Also, lower cost of debt increases the valuation of a company through a lower cost of 
capital, simultaneously increasing the expected rate of return for an investment. Thus, when 
the credit conditions are loose the amount of attractive targets should increase through lower 
cost of debt and more available deal financing which supports my hypothesis that general 
partners are then more willing to raise funds and moreover raise larger buyout funds.  
Additionally, mispricing theory implies that at times there exists opportunities between cost 
of debt and cost of equity in the market, from which private equity managers are able to 
benefit through better access to market wide information (Bachar, 1989)
5
. Agency conflict 
theory predicts that the limited liability of GPs and the option-like carry fee structure in 
compensation may lead to a tendency of GPs increasing the value of their option-like 
compensation scheme by investing more and making them more willing to overpay for targets 
relative to their fundamental value when credit market conditions are loose and access to debt 
is easy and interest rates are low (Axelson et al, 2009).  
Overall, economy-wide macro factors and moreover, credit market conditions are an 
important determinant of leverage in a buyout deal, pricing of the target and potential returns 
from the investment (Ljungvist et al (2008), Axelson et al (2009), Kaplan and Strömberg, 
(2009), Axelson et al (2010) and Robinson and Sensoy (2011)). Thus, when a private equity 
firm is considering of raising a buyout fund, one of the main constraint they face is capital 
market conditions which could limit the amount they can borrow. I hypothesize that more 
                                              
5
 Bachar (1999) claims in his study that investment banker are better informed about the market than investors. 
Thus, private equity managers who frequently receive market updates from various investment banks should also 
be as informed about the market as investment bankers, if not even better informed due to the exposure to 
multiple banks across the industry. 
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buyout funds and larger funds should be raised during loose credit market conditions
6
 than 
during tight credit market conditions, since (i) there should be better access to debt financing, 
(ii) lower cost of debt decreases the financing costs the transaction which (iii) lowers the 
average cost of capital thus increasing the valuation of the target. Thus, the investment 
opportunity set of potential target companies is larger at times of loose credit markets, which 
results in more private equity firms willing to raise a fund and raising larger funds. The 
opposite should be true when the credit market conditions are tight, leading to a fewer and 
smaller funds raised due to decreased investment opportunity set. 
1.2 Research questions 
This paper aims to show that buyout fundraising is driven by credit market conditions; when 
credit market conditions are loose more funds are raised, and more money is committed to a 
particular fund. I start by identifying various drivers behind the capital commitments into 
buyout funds based on previous literature. I do this by identifying factors of existing literature 
from private equity and venture capital funds , since no relevant literature of buyout funds 
exists. Then, I run comprehensive analyses on country-, firm- and fund-level to show that 
credit market conditions are related to (i) aggregate buyout fundraising volume, (ii) number of 
first-time buyout funds entering the market, (iii) likelihood of raising a fund, (vi) fund size 
and (v) performance. Finally, I will assess the economy-wide importance of credit market 
conditions on buyout fundraising and compare the results to the existing literature on venture 
capital market. 
1) What are the key macro and micro drivers of capital commitments into buyout funds? 
2) What is the impact of credit market conditions on aggregate buyout fundraising volumes, 
on number of new firms entering the buyout industry, likelihood of raising a fund, fund 
size and performance? 
3) Do credit market conditions have any implications on buyout fund performance? 
4) Are the dynamics of buyout market similar to venture capital? 
                                              
6
 One could question the timing, whether credit conditions at the time of fundraising affect the investment 
activity later on. I am going to discuss this more in Section 2.  
10 
 
 
1.3 Main results 
I start by identifying various drivers behind the capital commitments into buyout funds based 
on previous literature. I find that the factors relevant for venture capital fund are not 
significant drivers for buyout funds. The most s ignificant driver is credit spread and results 
indicate that at aggregate country level a 100 basis points decrease in the credit spread leads 
to an US$47billion increase in commitments to buyout funds across the industry in the 
following year. The significant increase in commitments is due to established GPs raising 
larger follow-on funds and more first time funds entering the buyout industry. A 100bps 
decrease in the credit spread increases the number of first-time buyout funds entering the 
market by 12
7
 the next year. The size of a follow-on fund raised by an established private 
equity firm increases by 17% when the credit spread decreases by 100bps.  
At the firm-level, the probability of a PE firm raising a follow-on fund is affected by the 
prevailing credit market conditions; however even though the results are statistically 
significant at a 1% level the economic significance is small. A decrease of 100bps in the 
credit spread increases the probability of a fund being raised by 5% across the industry
8
, and 
after controlling for fund level factors, such as for the performance of previous fund, the 
probability diminishes to 1.3% but still being statistically significant at the 1% level.  
I study GPs who decided to establish a PE firm and raise a buyout fund as their first fund. 
Compared to the prior literature by Kaplan and Schoar (2005) it seems that my results for 
buyout funds differ from venture capital funds – market returns do not affect the number nor 
size of new entrants – however indeed it seems that number of new entrants grows when the 
credit markets are loose, but the size of buyout funds is still not impacted. Moreover, the size 
of a first buyout fund raised by a new PE firm stays more or less constant over the period of 
1980-2011, which is a different characteristic from venture capital funds which have 
increased significantly. 
Although, my thesis does not go into detail on how the credit conditions affect the 
performance of a fund, I do test the matter briefly in order to find out more about the 
economy-wide implications of my research. My results show that funds that are initially 
                                              
7
 12 might seem like a small number, but my sample includes 500 first-time funds over 30 years thus 12 is 
statistically significant result at 1% level. 
8
 Across the industry means excluding firm and previous fund level factors, thus also includes first time funds. 
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raised and invested during the times of loose credit market conditions have a lower 
probability of raising follow-on funds, thus indicating poorer results. This is also in-line with 
findings from Axelson et al (2010) who also state that the reason behind this is that loose 
credit market conditions encourage to a misuse of debt which leads to a poorer fund returns.  
Finally, I end my study by comparing the performance characteristics of buyout funds to the 
existing literature on venture capital funds. I conclude that even though the macro-economic 
determinants of capital commitments into buyout funds differ from venture capital funds, the 
micro-level factors of fund performance behave similarly; across buyout and venture capital 
industries larger funds earn lower returns, however a particular GP earns larger returns with 
larger funds but the effect diminishing away at very large fund sizes. 
1.4 Contribution to the literature  
I contribute to existing literature in three key ways. First, the existing literature of capital 
commitments into buyout funds is rather new area of research; the existing literature about 
buyout funds and fundraising is rather scarce. Second, to the extent that the topic has been 
briefly touched upon in 1990-2005 with private equity data
9
, I bring at least 10 years of more 
recent data and thirdly, I run more comprehensive analysis studying my hypothesis at 
country-, firm- and fund-level.  
According to my knowledge, this is the first paper to exclusively study the drivers of buyout 
fundraising and aims to show empirical evidence that buyout fundraising is strongly driven by 
credit market conditions. Furthermore, since no other academic paper has studied the subject 
before, I aim to make an effort to identify the key determinants potentially driving the buyout 
fundraising from multiple papers studying venture capital and private equity funds. I study the 
buyout market dynamics at macro- and micro-level and compare my results to the existing 
empirical evidence on venture capital funds.  
I am using a more recent dataset which adds 10 years of more recent data compared to the 
prior literature on private equity fundraising, e.g. Kaplan and Schoar (2005). The literature on 
private equity fundraising is very scarce and limited only to a few papers which focus on 
venture capital (Gompers and Lerner, 1999) or private equity funds including both venture 
capital and buyout funds (Kaplan and Schoar, 2005). In the past, buyout funds have gained 
                                              
9
 Please refer to page 12section 2.5 for definition of private equity funds 
12 
 
 
less attention due to lack of data and the private nature of the information. Additionally, 
literature related to buyout funds is focused on performance. Now many new database 
companies such as Preqin have entered to the database market and collected fund specific 
information from both general partners and limited partners that enables me to obtain large 
enough sample of buyout funds and more reliable data, since data collected only from GPs is 
prone to selection bias regarding more poorly performing funds.  
The previous literature is mainly focused on a single perspective such as a country-level 
aggregate analysis or only fund-level analysis. My analyses are divided into three distinctive 
sections; aggregate country- level, firm-level and fund-level; I also have decomposed the 
aggregate fundraising volumes into separate factors such as size of a fund and number of 
funds, which have their own specific characteristics. Buyout market consists of established 
firms which are known to investors according to their reputation and new funds which have 
no previous track record on the market. The decision to raise a fund by these two different 
types of firms can be timed different and the fund size will also be different, thus it makes 
sense to analyse these separately.  
1.5 Methods, scope and limitations 
This thesis shows support that capital commitments into buyout funds are driven by loose 
credit market conditions. I aim to improve the methodology employed by prior studies which 
focus on macro factors by conducting the analysis on multiple levels to ensure robustness of 
results. I also use more sophisticated methods such as tobit regressions and heckman selection 
model, which assess the problem of selection bias. The private nature of information and the 
absence of regulated reporting standards makes the sample prone to selection bias since worse 
performing firms are reluctant to report. This results in over representation of better 
performing and larger funds, which makes the sample skewed to the right. 
Major limitation for this study is the private nature of the industry and difficulty to obtain 
reliable information; I aim to tackle this problem by obtaining data from two different 
databases, thus mitigating the problem of inconsistent observations.  Especially, with 
performance analysis I do robustness checks with the more comprehensive VE data.  The main 
limitation of this study is that I do not observe the exact dates that the fundraising was 
initiated, but I obtain the funds’ closing dates as annual figures and rely on the assumptions 
13 
 
 
that on average first close of a fund takes place in the middle of a year
10
. I try to mitigate this 
problem by using various annual proxies for credit market conditions which are defined as 
averages over different months to see whether my results hold.  
1.6 Structure 
The paper is organized as follows. The second section describes the private equity business 
model and introduces the key concepts applied in this paper. The third section is about 
previous literature. The fourth section introduces the hypotheses. The fifth section describes 
the data and sample selection process. The sixth section introduces the methodology 
employed. The results from the empirical analysis are shown in the seventh section. The final 
section concludes the paper.  
                                              
10
 Prior study using the same method by Kaplan and Schoar (2005) 
14 
 
 
2 PRIVATE EQUITY  
In general, private equity is defined as a medium or long-term equity investment into 
companies that are not traded on a stock exchange. Private equity investment is typically a 
transformational, value-added and active strategy. Investments include venture capital and 
buyout transactions as well as investments in hedge funds, funds of funds , distressed debt 
funds and other securities. In this section, I will introduce the private equity business model in 
general and then go through buyout funds in more detail.  
2.1 Private equity business model 
The prevailing structure for private equity fund investments in the United States (US) and in 
many European countries is limited partnership, in which the private equity firm serves as the 
general partner (GP) and the investors serve as limited partners (LPs). The limited partnership 
is a legally defined structure and is considered an attractive vehicle to investors mostly due to 
liability and tax reasons. The LPs’ liability is limited to the committed capital and they are not 
allowed to participate in the active management of a fund while the GP is fully responsible for 
all investment activities and assumes unlimited responsibility for the consequences of 
management and investment decisions. Unlike corporations, these partnerships are set up as 
closed-end funds with finite life spans. Typically, a private equity fund has duration of ten 
years, often with a possible two-year extension (Gilligan and Wright, 2010).  
Figure 1 Private equity business model 
 
 
 
 
  
LIMITED 
PARTNERS
FUND
INVESTMENT 
ADVISOR
GENERAL 
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Figure 2 Phases of private equity fund’s cycle 
 
The four phases of private equity funds; first is the fundraising, second investing the fund, third managing the 
investments and finally the redistribution of capital. (Source: EVCA) 
 
The creation of a fund occurs through private equity firms  that collect capital from investors.  
Private equity firms could use placement agents, who on the behalf of the private equity fund 
manager talk to potential investors. In order to align interests and mitigate the information 
asymmetries between LPs and GPs, the LPs usually require the GPs to commit typically 1-3 
percentages of the total committed capital. What happens in fundraising, in practice, is that 
LPs commit to invest in the fund up to predetermined level and GPs draw on the 
commitments when making the investments into various portfolio companies. Meaning that 
the investors pay no cash up front and thus the funds do not have any idle cash. Even though, 
the commitments are invested usually during the following few years, I classify the total 
aggregate commitment to the year it was raised. According to EVCA, the fundraising period 
usually lasts for six months to one year and GPs raise a new fund every 3 to 5 years as the 
previous fund is fully invested.  
Second phase is the investing of the committed capital into target companies, known as 
investee companies or the portfolio. According to Gompers and Lerner (1999) venture capital 
funds draw on and invest the committed capital over a two to three year time period. The 
practice indicates that private equity firms are under a pressure to invest the committed capital 
promptly to generate returns for investors. The investment made can be anything between 
100% full ownership or co-investment of smaller size. The fund’s ownership in the portfolio 
 
 
Investing 
Fundraising 
 
 
 
Redistributing 
Managing 
• Creation of the fund 
• Takes usually 6 – 12 
months 
• PE firms raise new 
fund every 3 – 5 years  
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company is usually organized through holding company, thus not affecting portfolio 
company’s taxation or cost structure. 
The third phase is managing the investment. The fund managers are responsible for creating 
value to their LPs, thus they actively manage the portfolio companies and pursue to increase 
the value through e.g. divestments and add-ons. A widely studied area in private equity is the 
determinants of the wealth creation to LPs. In general, average holding period is three to six 
years. The GPs report back to LPs on regular basis, usually quarterly according to industry 
guidelines. 
The fourth and last phase is redistribution. Usually, when the fund exits a portfolio company 
the proceeds are turned to investors on a pro-rate basis depending on the size of their initial 
investment. Altogether, the fund has normally a life span, time between commitments and 
redistribution, of 8-13 years.  
2.2 Characteristics of the industry 
Private equity is commonly described as rather illiquid and sticky, since there is no public 
active secondary market for the LPs interests. Recently, due to the need of institutional 
investors to stream line their private equity portfolios, the secondary market for LPs interests 
has experienced significant growth
11
. However, the secondary market volumes are still low 
and mostly comprise “tail-funds”12. 
2.3 Investors  
The type of investors investing in private equity varies greatly between private equity asset 
classes. In 2012, the largest investors in European buyout funds were pension funds 
contributing 22% of total commitments, while banks contribute the second largest amount of 
18% and funds of funds 17% of total commitments. While in venture capital funds 
government agencies are the largest investors with 34% and private individuals 15% (EVCA, 
Yearbook 2012). Significant differences in investors between asset classes stem mainly from 
policy and regulatory issues as well as investors’ risk aversion. 
                                              
11
 Preqin Special Report: Private Equity Secondary Market (2013) 
12
 Tail-funds refer to funds old vintage-year, e.g. in 2012 38% of funds sold were pre-2004 vintages i.e. tail-
funds. 
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The investor base does not stay constant through time, moreover there has been significant 
shifts over time. The creation of a new vehicle “limited partnership” in the 1980s , regulatory 
changes such as the clarification of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) 
“prudent man rule” in 1978, which allowed corporate pension funds to invest in a variety of 
investment products beyond bond and stock of very large companies in US, play an important 
role in drivers behind the investor base development. In the UK, the move towards the 
Competition and Credit Control policy in 1971 gave banks greater investment flexibility.  
Figure 3 demonstrates the magnitude of the shift in total commitments to private equity by 
investor type; panel A presents US market and panel B Europe. As noted, private equity is 
fairly new asset class in Europe, thus the data for investors in European funds is from 1998. 
Figures clearly present the overall trend in both markets. The figure for US, since the birth of 
private equity to current date, presents the shift from individual investors to pension funds, 
insurance companies and banks.  
Figure 3 Development of private equity investor types by capital invested 
Panel A presents the capital invested in US funds by various investor types as of total contributions into private 
equity industry. US 1978 data is from Gompers and Lerner (1999) and 2001-2011 is from Preqin. Panel B 
presents the capital invested in European funds. 1998-2002 data is from EVCA investor forum (2004) and 2011 
from EVCA Yearbook (2012). 
Panel A: Capital invested in US funds Panel B: Capital invested in European funds 
    
 
Whereas, the figure for Europe, over the last decade, shows how government agencies and 
endowments comprise increasing share of the total fund contributions while the contributions  
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by banks and insurance companies has decreased due to “denominator effect13” and will be 
intensified by impending regulatory changes relating to the Volcker Rule, Basel III and 
Solvency II and AIFMD as a general concern.  
2.4 Private equity firms 
A private equity firm, also known as private management company or GP is an investment 
management company, usually organized as a partnership or limited liability corporation. 
Private equity firms establish and manage investment funds by collecting capital from 
investors, make investing decision and take active role in the strategic management of 
investee companies. The management company is usually remunerated by an annual 
management charge which can be up to 2,5% of investor’s initial commitments to the fund. 
Additionally, the GPs are entitled to carried interest, which is typically 20% of the profits of 
the fund. However, the carried interest is often paid after the investors have received the 
amount they invested in the fund plus a hurdle representing a basic pre-negotiated rate of 
return. 
2.5 Private equity funds 
A private equity investment fund is a vehicle for enabling pooled investment by a number of 
investors in equity and equity-related securities of companies. The vehicle can be structured 
as a company or an unincorporated arrangement such as a limited partnership. Private equity 
funds are commonly structured as closed-end funds meaning that the investors cannot redeem 
their interests and that the funds are self-liquidating. Private equity funds are usually 
categorized under “alternative investments” with hedge funds, real estate and interest rates to 
name a few, including several of different investment strategies and asset classes that are 
complimentary to the stock and bond assets. According to EVCA and this is also the 
definition used for this paper, private equity funds could be divided into four; venture capital, 
buyout, mezzanine capital and special situations. Buyout and venture capital funds 
compromise the largest share of private equity. 
                                              
13
 Denominator effect refers to a problem identified in private equity in which the investor’s overall value of 
asset portfolio declines due to decreasing market values, which in turn leads to a selloff assets in order to 
maintains strict guidelines for asset allocations. 
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A buyout fund makes leveraged buyouts, management buyouts or acquisition investments and 
typically, targets acquisition of significant portion or majority control of businesses which 
normally entail a change of ownership, whereas venture capital funds invest with smaller 
equity stakes in undeveloped or developing products or revenue and thus less mature 
businesses. Buyout funds invest in more mature companies than venture capital funds to 
finance expansions, consolidations, turnaround and sales, or spinouts of divisions or 
subsidiaries. However, the investment styles can vary widely and buyout funds may take 
either active or passive management role. These funds use debt in addition to equity to 
leverage the size of their investments and increase the potential return on investment. Buyout 
fund sizes are defined as follows according to Legacy mode in Thomson One Platform; small 
buyout < US$250m, mid buyout US$250m < x < US$500m, large buyout US$500m < X < 
US$1,000m, mega buyout >US$1,000m. 
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3 LITERATURE REVIEW 
In this section, I aim to provide theoretical background to my hypothesis from micro- and 
macro-economic point of view. First, I will discuss capital structure in buyout fund 
transaction based on existing literature. Second, I am going to introduce the theories behind 
capital allocations and then discuss how capital structure choices may impact the aggregate 
fundraising patterns. Third, I introduce theories that explain corporate finance waves and 
discuss the implications to buyout fundraising.  
3.1 Capital structure in buyout fund transactions 
As discussed above, buyout funds often aim to reach a majority ownership in the target which 
requires a large capital investment. Capital investments are financed both with equity and 
debt, and as the term leveraged buyout (LBO) indicates typically large proportion is financed 
with debt in order to shrink the amount of equity required. Leverage also intensifies the 
ownership incentives that are important to efficiency. Extensive level of leverage also means 
that it comes in many forms (Jensen, 1989). A typical LBO transaction includes various types 
of debt, which vary across time and type.  
The early era of LBOs in the 1980s is featured with leverage leveling up to 90% of the 
transaction value and the use of below investment grade debt, junk bonds. After that the debt 
levels dropped a little in 1990s and 2000s. However, during 2004-2007 the leverage ratios 
climbed to all-time highs again driven by the growth in collateralized debt obligations and 
other forms of securitization. Current levels are down to 60-80% of debt employed in a deal 
(Kaplan and Strömberg, 2008).  
While in the 1980s banks were the primary investors in the most senior and secured loans 
(Kaplan and Strömberg, 2009), nowadays the majority of the debt is provided by the 
syndicated loan market (Axelson et al, 2010). In the past, the syndicated loans operated as 
bridge financing facility for public (often high-yield) bond issues. However, during liquid 
syndicated loan market investors tend to hold the debt, either in original form or in 
collateralized loan obligations resulting in little refinancing of bank debt (Axelson et 
al.,2009). The leverage ratios employed in LBOs in US and Europe are not significantly 
different, however the type of debt used seems to vary. US markets are more characterized by 
bonds and subordinated debt, and greater use of bullet debt in the syndicated loans.  For 
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European deals a higher fraction of the debt (89%) is bank loans and more tranches are 
employed in financing then in US bank debt, averaging 4.7 tranches for the European debt 
compared to 2.9 for the US debt (Axelson et al ,2009). 
As leverage is such a major component in LBO transactions executed by buyout funds, it is 
reasonable to assume that credit market conditions play their role when GPs are deciding 
whether to  raise a fund or not. As for my knowledge, there is no prior study about the relation 
between credit conditions and capital commitments into buyout funds. However, there are 
prior studies on the relation between credit markets and leverage buyout transactions. 
Ljungvist et al. (2008), Axelson et al (2009), Kaplan and Strömberg (2009), Axelson et al 
(2010) and Robinson and Sensoy (2011) provide evidence that average credit spreads are 
negatively related to investment activity by buyout funds, transaction prices, and leverage.  In 
the following section, I will introduce the relevant capital structure theories and discuss 
existing empirical results on determinants in private equity fundraising, particularly about 
venture capital fundraising, since prior literature on buyout fundraising is limited. 
Furthermore, I also over briefly theories about merger waves since those are relevant for my 
aggregate country-level analysis.  
3.2 Capital structure theories 
Above, in section 3.1, I discussed the observations on the structure of LBO transactions over 
time and across countries. It seemed evident from the observations that macro factors , 
especially credit market conditions are the key drivers of buyout funds’ transactions. Next, I 
will elaborate more about the existing capital structure theories and aim to provide theoretical 
background to support the potential link between credit markets and buyout fundraising 
volumes. 
3.2.1 Perfect markets theory 
According to Modigliani-Miller theorem
14
 the capital structure in LBO s should be irrelevant. 
The value should be driven by fundamental asset value and no particular factor should explain 
the leverage used in a transaction. However, empirical evidence does not support this 
                                              
14
 Modigliani-Miller theorem suggests that in the absence of taxes, bankruptcy costs, agency costs, and 
asymmetric information and in an efficient market the value of the firm is not affected by its capital structure.  
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hypothesis, since the theorem ignores taxes, bankruptcy costs, agency costs and asymmetric 
information. 
3.2.2 Tradeoff theory and adjusted present value rule 
On the contrary to perfect market hypothesis, the tradeoff and adjusted present value –theories 
state that capital markets are not perfect thus leverage can affect the value of the transaction. 
Tradeoff theory states that tax and incentives from used debt level exactly offset expected 
financial distress costs at the optimal level. Moreover, the pecking order theory by Myers and 
Majluf (1984) complements the tradeoff theory. Pecking order states that due to information 
asymmetries the issuance of securities is costly, so firms stray from the optimal target 
leverage suggested by the pure tradeoff theorem. The adjusted present value theory suggests 
that GPs valuing the targets should price the company according to fundamental value 
adjusted with financial side-effect such as tax benefits of debt (Axelson et al, 2009).  
3.2.3 Mispricing theory 
Kaplan and Strömberg (2008) present a mispricing hypothesis as a possible explanation to 
industry wide buyout commitments and transaction patterns
15
. Buyout fund managers are able 
to benefit from the mispricing between cost of debt and cost of equity, when the cost of debt 
is significantly lower than the cost of equity compared to the company’s risk, enabling the 
fund to create value through borrowing. Mispricing stems from market frictions which enable  
debt and equity markets to become segmented.  
In the beginning of the previous wave in 2006, there was a mispricing in the cost of debt for a 
given credit rating according to Kaplan and Strömberg (2008). At the time, the interest rates 
were 250 basis points over the LIBOR (London Interbank Offered Rate) and by 2008 the 
interest rates had risen by 250 basis points to 500 basis points. If one had borrowed for a rate 
of 250 basis points too low and assuming a typical debt ratio of 70% in a transaction, then the 
mispricing would have justif ied 10% of the purchase price. Therefore, against this 
background I hypothesize that more investment opportunities should reach the IRR targets 
(aka high enough NPVs) when there exists mispricing in the cost of debt, which could lead to 
more or/and larger buyout funds being raised as a response to increased amount of potential 
                                              
15
The working paper by Kaplan and Strömberg (2008) suggest a theoretical background however they do not 
conduct an empirical study of this. 
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investment opportunities. In my thesis, I use the variation in the corporate bonds’s interest 
rate over risk free rate to measure when the credit spread is relatively lower over time.   
Axelson et al (2010) and Baker and Wurgler (2002) support the mispricing view by showing 
evidence that GPs increase the leverage in LBO transactions when the debt markets are 
favorable to arbitrage the conditions between debt and equity markets. Their results show that 
buyout leverage responds more to credit conditions than to the firm characteristics suggested 
by the tradeoff theory, and additionally higher prices are paid when the debt financing is 
“cheap”. They also state that according to practitioners, one way private equity funds make 
money is to arbitrarily time the mispricing on the markets. Furthermore, public firms are 
subject to same bias as debt market investors, therefore not observing the mispricing while 
GPs are rational and willing to pay higher prices and increase the leverage when the debt is 
“cheap”. Axelson et al (2010) suggest that the market-timing hypothesis also predicts that 
fund returns should be higher when the private equity sponsors are able to use higher leverage 
to finance individual deals.  
3.2.4 Agency conflicts theory 
Axelson et al (2010) apply the classical corporate finance agency problem theory to private 
equity funds. The limited liability of GPs and the option-like carry fee structure in 
compensation may lead to overinvestment and gambling by the GPs. Therefore, when the 
credit markets are loose and access to debt is easy and interest rates are low, the GPs have a 
tendency to increase the value of their option-like compensation scheme by investing more 
and making them more willing to overpay for the targets relative to the fundamental value. 
Agency conflicts theory suggests that buyout leverage is more driven by market factors than 
firm-specific characteristics. Contrary to the market-timing theory, agency conflicts theory 
suggests that the extensive leverage is harmful to investors and will lead to lower returns on 
average. Also, Axelson et al (2010) suggest that the mispricing and agency conflicts can occur 
simultaneously; moreover the mispricing can exacerbate the agency conflict by making it 
easier for GPs to over lever at the expense of LPs. 
3.3 Theories of corporate finance waves 
I include this section, since I also run analysis at aggregate country-level. The prior literature 
on causes behind merger waves can be summarized into two competing theories; behavioral 
hypotheses and neoclassical hypotheses. Behavioral hypothesis suggests that stock valuations 
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drive the merger activity. Bidders use their overvalued stock to buy the real assets of 
undervalued targets through mergers. The neoclassical hypotheses claims that mergers are not 
driven by high stock market valuations, but rather mergers occur due to specific industry 
specific shocks which propagate into aggregate waves when there is enough liquidity on the 
market. First, I am going to discuss briefly about the two theories and second, elaborate more 
how the theories apply to buyout fundraising patterns. 
3.3.1 Behavioral theory 
Behavioral theory suggests that rational managers are arbitrarily able to benefit from the 
misvaluations on the inefficient markets (Shleifer and Vishny, 2003). They argue that target 
managers accept the bidder’s temporarily overvalued equity, because they employ short time 
horizons when evaluating the benefits from the bid. Overvaluation in the aggregate or in 
certain industries would lead to wave-like clustering in time. Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan 
(2004) develop a model, in which the target managers are rational and willing to accept bids 
from overvalued bidders during high market valuations because they do not have perfect 
information and thus they overestimate synergies during these periods. Scharfstein & Stein 
(1990), Zhang (1997), Graham (1999), Milbourn, Boot and Thakor (1999) provide 
applications of herding models in finance, which could be extended and applied to acquisition 
decisions to generate a herding explanation for merger waves. Herding hypothesis refers to an 
action in which a firm follows the behavior of the preceding decision maker and allows it to 
affect its choice ignoring its own information.  Herding hypothesis on merger waves implies 
that following firms are imitating the action of predecessor. 
3.3.2 Neoclassical theory 
Mitchell and Mulherin (1995) study the industry-level patterns in takeover and restructuring 
activity during the 1982-1989 across 51 industries. They found that industry shocks contribute 
to the extensive takeover and restructuring activity of that decade. Their work is 
complemented by Jarrad Harford (2005), who presents support for their study that merger 
waves occur in response to specific industry shocks that require large scale reallocation of 
assets. Furthermore, he shows that shocks need to be accompanied by sufficient capital 
liquidity to form aggregate waves. Harford (2005) finds that the proxy for capital liquidity 
and reduction in financing constraints is correlated with high asset values. He claims that the 
variables that separately measure capital liquidity and market valuations indicate that the 
relationship between merger waves and stock market valuations is misattributed to behavioral 
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misevaluation factors. Therefore, according to him merger waves are driven rather by higher 
macro-level capital liquidity and lower transaction costs than purely by market values as 
behavioral hypothesis suggests.  
3.3.3 Buyout fundraising waves 
There are currently no theories trying to assess the buyout fundraising patterns. An intuitive 
approach could be that the buyout funds serve as a financing instrument facilitating the 
merger activity. First, following the logic behind behavioral hypothesis, buyout funds would 
also be taking advantage of mispricing on the market. The GPs, that are better informed about 
the market condition through exposure to multiple investment banks that pitch constantly 
various ideas to them and send frequent market updates (Bachar, 1989), could be trying to 
time the market and benefit from the mispricing between the cost of equity and debt. Second, 
taking the neoclassical point of view, buyout funds may facilitate the large asset allocations 
that occur due to industry shocks. When there is enough liquidity on the markets and 
transaction costs are low, capital flows into buyout funds that may act as intermediates in 
asset allocations in industries where shocks take place. There are currently no papers studying 
the waves of buyout fundraising.  
In this thesis, the proxy used to estimate the credit market conditions also proxies for capital 
liquidity in the markets. Harford (2005) claims that higher capital liquidity in the market is 
associated with lower transaction costs, financing constraints and ease of financing.  
Therefore, a proxy that estimates the condition of credit markets could also be a proxy for 
capital liquidity in the market. Furthermore, Shleifer and Vishny (1992) provide further 
support that loose credit market conditions are associated with capital liquidity. They argue 
that the increase in asset liquidity made possible the large growth of the public junk bond 
market in the early and mid-1980s.  
While in this thesis, I aim to study the relation between credit conditions and capital 
commitments into buyout funds using a Moody’s BAA corporate bond spread as a proxy of 
credit market conditions, I cannot rule out the possibility that the credit spread also proxies  
the capital liquidity on the market since the two are highly correlated. The buyout fundraising 
at macro level could be driven by the overall capital liquidity as suggested by neoclassical 
hypothesis. As a conclusion, at micro level the potential investments opportunity set for a 
given fund could increase through more favorable financing terms and lower cost of debt and, 
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on the macro level the economy-wide clustering in buyout fundraising could be explained by 
the capital liquidity hypothesis. 
Table 1 Overview of existing literature on merger waves 
The table summarizes the existing literature on the key theories behind merger waves. The table is not an 
exhaustive summary of all the merger wave literature. 
 
3.4 Empirical evidence from credit markets 
Next, I will discuss the existing empirical evidence of the relation between credit market 
conditions and private equity funds. Prior literature is mostly focused on credit market 
conditions being a major driver for capital structure in LBOs, quantity of investments made 
by buyout funds, LBO pricing and calls and distributions
16
. However, no prior empirical 
evidence exists from credit markets being a driver of capital commitments into buyout funds. 
Ljungvist et al. (2008), Axelson et al (2009), Kaplan and Strömberg (2009), Axelson et al 
(2010) and Robinson and Sensoy (2011) provide evidence that loose credit markets measured 
with average credit spreads
17
 are negatively related to investment activity by buyout funds, 
transaction prices, and leverage.  In other words, during loose credit markets buyout funds 
make more investments and pay higher prices for targets. Furthermore, buyout funds also use 
more debt financing in their transactions and existing literature shows that the leverage levels  
are more affected by time-variant changes in the economy-wide cost of borrowing than by 
firm specific characteristics. After controlling for industry fixed-effects such as profitability, 
earnings volatility and growth opportunities, which explain the variation among public 
companies, the result still holds, indicating that leverage in LBOs is driven more by time-
series effects than cross-sectional effects. Furthermore, Axelson et al. (2010) and Robinson 
                                              
16
 Calls refer to capital calls by GPs. GPs have a legal right to demand a portion of the money promised to it by 
LPs. Distribution refers to money paid back to LPs by GPs, after the fund has exited an investment. 
17
 Prior literature uses credit spread between corporate bond returns and risk-free rate as a proxy for credit 
market conditions. This choice of proxy has been discussed more in section 5.4 on page 44. 
Study 
Author 
(Published) 
Time period 
Region 
focus 
Data 
What drives merger waves? (Journal of 
financial economics, References #601) 
Jarrad Harford 
(2005) 
1981-2000 
48 industry 
groups 
SDC 
The impact of industry shocks on takeover 
and restructuring activity (Journal of 
financial economics, References #929) 
Mark Mitchell & 
Harold Mulherin 
(1995) 
1981-1989 
51 
Industries 
in US 
Moody’s & 
Value Line 
Investment 
Survey 
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and Sensoy (2011) show evidence that the yield spread also affects private equity calls and 
distributions. The distributions are affected more since rising yield spread makes it difficult 
for potential acquirers to finance the acquisitions, and thus exiting the investment becomes 
complicated. 
Axelson et al. (2010), Kaplan and Stein (1993), Axelson et al (2009) and Shivdasani and 
Wang (2011) show that availability of financing relates to boom and bust cycles in the private 
equity market.  They provide evidence that leverage is pro-cyclical, peaking in “hot” markets 
and deteriorating when the debt markets fall.  Kaplan and Stein (1993) provide evidence from 
the 1980s by studying the pricing and leverage in LBO deals. Their results suggest that junk 
bond market that began around 1985 increased the pricing and debt financing in buyouts 
compared to early 1980s. The credit market turmoil during 2007 - 2008 suggests that overly 
favorable terms from debt investors may have contributed to the buyout wave from 2005 
through mid-2007 (Axelson et al., 2010). Moreover, Shivdasani and Wang (2011) find a 
correlation between a bank’s LBO lending and its access to CDO (collateralized debt 
obligations) capital through underwriting capabilities, indicating that banks more active in 
CDOs lent more for LBOs. Thus, they find evidence that structured credit fuelled the LBO 
boom during 2004-2007. 
As a conclusion, investments, leverage and pricing patterns in LBOs indicate that during 
recession the financing of few potential deals is difficult and during boom times there is 
plenty of financing so that even poorer quality deals get financed (Gompers and Lerner, 
1999). Therefore it is likely that private equity activity is highly correlated with the liquidity 
in the market for corporate debt (Axelson et al. 2008 and Kaplan and Strömberg, 2009).  
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Table 2 Summary of previous literature on credit markets and buyout funds’ 
investments, leverage and cash flows  
This table summarizes the previous literature from the studies analyzing the relation between buyout funds and 
credit markets. The results are summarized in section 0. Previous literature in more focused on quantity of LBO 
transactions, leverage and pricing, rather than buyout funds and capital flows. LP refers to anonymous limited 
partner. 
Study Author 
(Published) 
Time 
period 
Region 
focus 
Data Source Focus 
Cyclicality, performance 
measurement and cash flow liquidity 
in private equity (Working paper, 
References 18) 
Robinson 
and Sensoy 
(2011) 
1984-
2010 
US & 
Europe 
837 BO 
and VC 
funds 
LP Investments 
Did structured credit fuel the LBO 
boom? (Journal of finance, 
References 40) 
Shivdasani 
and Wang 
(2011) 
1996-
2008 
US 
345 
LBOs 
SDC 
CDOs and 
LBOs 
Borrow cheap, buy high? (Working 
paper, References  66) 
Axelson et 
al. (2010) 
1980-
2008 
US & 
Europe 
1,175 
LBOs 
Capital
IQ 
Leverage 
Leveraged buyouts and private 
equity (Journal of Economic 
perspectives, References 311) 
Kaplan and 
Strömberg 
(2009) 
1996-
2004 
US 
43 
LBOs 
Capital
IQ 
Transactions 
Leverage and pricing in buyouts; 
Empirical analysis (Working paper, 
References 98) 
Axelson et 
al. (2009) 
N/A N.Am 
153 
LBOs 
Capital
IQ 
Leverage and 
pricing 
Why are buyouts levered? The 
financial structure of private equity 
funds (Journal of finance, References 
135) 
Axelson et 
al. (2009) 
N/A N/A N/A - 
Financial 
structures 
Investment behavior of buyout funds; 
Theory and evidence (Working 
paper, References 93) 
Ljungvist et 
al.(2008) 
1981-
2000 
US 
207 BO 
funds, 
2,274 
LBOs 
LP Investements 
Evolution of buyout pricing and 
financial structure in the 1980s 
(Quarterly Journal of Economics, 
References 349) 
Kaplan and 
Stein (1993) 
1980-
1989 
N/A 
124 
LBOs 
N/A 
Pricing and 
leverage 
3.5 Empirical evidence on private equity fundraising  
In contrast to the extensive literature on the determinants affecting the venture capital 
fundraising volume, literature on buyout determinants is very limited due to lack of data on 
buyout funds previously and the private nature of information. However, recent developments 
such as the buyout fund boom in 2007 and entrance of many new database companies that 
have collected fund specific information from both GPs and LPs, have enabled this study 
about buyout fundraising that would not have been possible otherwise.  As for my knowledge, 
Kaplan and Schoar (2005) are the first ones to carry out a comprehensive study on the drivers 
of private equity fundraising, and mostly focusing on venture capital funds which represent 
80% of their dataset. Additionally, Balboa and Marti (2003) study the macroeconomic 
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determinants of aggregate country level fundraising volume, however their study limits to 
country-level analysis and is potentially exposed to many errors
18
. While, the existing 
literature of buyout fundraising is limited, the past literature on venture capital fundraising is 
more extensive (Gompers and Lernern, 1999, Jeng and Wells, 2000, and Poterba, 1989). 
Kaplan and Schoar (2005) analyze the relation between capital flows and performance from 
various viewpoints such as market timing dynamics and entry of new funds. However, their 
analysis related to capital commitments are conducted only at annual aggregate level 
including 20 annual observations; thus, providing only rough estimates of industry trends, 
which I will try to confirm at fund-level. Overall, their analyses are more focused on the 
effect of micro determinants such as sequence of the fund, size and performance on fund 
flows. And from macroeconomic perspective their conclusions of economic condition are 
based solely on the market return
19
 variable. As a conclusion, their study analyzes few, mostly 
fund-level variables, but from various perspectives such as from the probability of raising a 
new fund, number of new entrants and annual aggregate amount of capital raised by new GPs.  
Balboa and Marti (2003) focus solely on macroeconomic variables at the aggregate country 
level providing less confidence than fund-level analysis. They employ a short time period and 
also fail to control for fund-specific variables which are major drivers according to prior 
literature. Therefore, their results should be interpreted with caution, since even though there 
could be some correlation between the macroeconomic factors and fund flows at aggregate 
country level, it is not strong enough proof that the fund flows are actually driven by the 
macroeconomic factors. The correlation could be present due to some third omitted variable, 
i.e. endogeneity problem could be present , which they fail to control for. 
Overall, the prior literature on determinants affecting the buyout fundraising is insufficient 
and not robust. Therefore, I use more sophisticated methods, which I am going to discuss  
more in the methods section 6, and run the regression on macro and micro-level in order to 
increase the confidence levels and make sure the macroeconomic variables are significant 
even after controlling for fund-level factors. Next, I am going to briefly cover the previous 
                                              
18
 The variables tested by prior literature are partly overlapping and are prone to multicollinearity . Namely, 
Balboa and Marti (2003) have included in the same model GDP growth, growth of market capitalization and 
stock market returns. There is a great danger of multicollinearity, since capital inflow into private equity tend to 
increase with rising economy, which is likely to result in growth in market capitalization, meaning that the stock 
market returns will simultaneously increase.  
19
 Market return is measured with S&P 500 and Nasdaq. 
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empirical evidence on the factors driving the capital inflow into private equity and discuss 
their relevance to buyout funds.  
3.5.1 Macro determinants 
In this section, I am going to discuss the macro determinants of private equity fundraising.  
Table 3 on page 31 indicates that prior literature is almost entirely focused on venture capital 
or total private equity sample, due to low number of buyout observations in the past. The key 
macro-economic determinants are such as; GDP, market return and capitalization, interest rate 
on Treasury bill, regulation of pension funds, industry returns, R&D expenses, labor market 
rigidity, capital tax rate, financial accounting standards, investments and divestments and 
aggregate domestic savings. In the next section, I am going to discuss the micro factors. 
State of economy 
Private equity fundraising is potentially affected by the general health of the economy. The 
state of the overall economy affects both supply and demand side of the fundraising according 
to prior academic research. Jeng and Wells (2000), Gompers and Lerner (1999) and Balboa 
and Marti (2003) suggest that if the economy is rising, measured with GDP growth, there 
might be more business opportunities for entrepreneurs, which should increase the demand 
for venture capital funds. Increased demand for funds should lead to a growth in the 
opportunity set for investors, which in turn should increase the supply i.e. the amount of 
commitments to venture capital funds. Additionally, Jeng and Wells (2000) argue that 
increase in market capitalization leads to more favorable investor environment, which in turn 
means greater supply of fund committed to venture capital industry. Additionally, Kaplan and 
Schoar (2005) find that more VC partnerships are started after a period in which the industry 
performed well (measured with market returns) and that the first-time funds tend to raise 
larger funds. Their results for buyout funds are insignificant, though. 
Interest rates on Treasury bills 
Gompers and Lerner (1999) find that the Treasury bill return in the previous year is negative 
and significant at state-level, however positively related to the probability of raising a new 
fund. They claim that the effect might result from the early 1980s when rapid increase in 
number of funds raised occurred and real interest rates were high, indicating that their result 
may not entirely be robust. Balboa and Marti (2003) include Treasury bond yield and claim  
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Table 3 Summary of literature on macroeconomic determinants on PE fundraising 
Table below provides a summary of macro-economic determinants related to the private equity fundraising 
presented by previous literature. Independent variable refers to variable used as explanatory variable for dollar-
volume or number of funds raised. Academic paper refers to a study which provides the evidence. PE refers to 
private equity sample and includes both buyout and venture capital funds. VC is venture capital funds solely and 
BO is buyout funds solely. PE signif, VC signif and BO signif refers to whether the coefficient of the variable 
was found to be significant or not; “Yes” means the coefficient is  reported significant at least at 1%, 5% or 10% 
level and “No” means that it is significant at >11%-level or higher. PE -/+, VC -/+ and BO -/+ refers to whether 
the coefficient had negative sign or positive. 
 
 
Independent variable Academic paper 
(Published) 
 PE 
Signif. 
PE 
-/+ 
VC 
Signif. 
VC 
-/+ 
BO 
Signif. 
BO 
-/+ 
Growth in GDP Gompers and Lerner (1999)    Yes Pos   
Jeng and Wells (2000)  No Pos No Pos   
Balboa and Marti (2003)  Yes Pos     
Growth of market capitalization Jeng and Wells (2000)  No Pos No Pos   
Balboa and Marti (2003)  No Pos     
Market returns Kaplan (2005)   Yes Pos     
Balboa and Marti (2003)  No Pos     
Gompers & Lerner (1999)    Yes Pos   
Interest rates on Treasury bills 
Gompers and Lerner (1999) 
 
  
Yes/ 
No 
Yes/ 
Yes 
  
Balboa and Marti (2003)  Yes/No No/No     
Pension fund reg. Gompers and Lerner (1999)    No Pos   
Pension fund levels Jeng and Wells (2000)’ 
 
 
Yes Pos     
Industry returns Kaplan and Schoar (2005)    Yes Pos No Neg 
Return (IPOs) Gompers and Lerner (1999)     Yes Pos   
Labor market rigidity Jeng and Wells (2000)  No Neg No Neg   
Accounting standards Jeng and Wells (2000)  No Pos Yes Neg   
Tax on capital gains Gompers and Lerner (1999)    Yes Neg   
Poterba (1989)    Yes Neg   
IPO activity Jeng and Wells (2000)  Yes Pos Yes Pos   
Balboa and Marti (2003)   Yes Pos     
R&D expenses  Gompers and Lerner (1999)    No Pos   
Domestic savings Balboa and Marti (2003)  No Pos     
Investments & divestments Balboa and Marti (2003)  Yes Pos     
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that an increase in the long term interest rate of Treasury bond
20
 has negative impact on the 
volume of funds raised, since Treasury bonds represents alternative investment choice and 
when the interest rate goes up, more available capital flows into Treasury bonds and less to 
private equity. However, their results are ambiguous and insignificant.  
Pension fund levels 
As mentioned in the 2.3 investor section, an important factor in the private equity fundraising 
are the institutional investors who are holding a large proportion of available assets in a nation 
under their management. Jeng and Wells (2000) test for pension fund levels across countries 
in their analysis. They find that private pension fund levels are significant determinant over 
time but not across countries. They think that it results from different regulation across 
countries, and once they control for fixed effects, they get significant results.  
Regulation of private equity 
Gompers and Lerner (1999) find greater probability of a fund being raised following the 
clarification to ERISA
21
  in late 1970s since it allowed investments in early-stage funds. After 
the amendment, venture organizations could raise focused funds without worrying that 
pension funds would avoid investing in these due to the concern over its perceived riskiness. I 
am controlling for time fixed effects and cross-sectional fixed effects, catches the country and 
time specific factors and legal and regulatory environment, thus removing the problem of 
omitted variable.  
Industry returns 
Prior papers studying the relation between capital inflows into private equity and industry 
returns from a given industry get noticeably different results regarding whether they use 
venture capital or buyout fund sample. Gompers and Lerner (1999)
22
 find that fund-level 
results are significant and positive; however aggregate industry returns are an insignificant 
                                              
20
 10-year Treasury bond, since it matches the investment period 
21
 The clarification of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) is “prudent man rule” in 1978, 
which allowed corporate pension funds to invest in a variety of investment products beyond bond and stock of 
very large companies in US; the investments would be judged “prudent” not by their individual risk, but by their 
contribution to portfolio risk. 
22
 Gompers and Lerner (1999) use the value of firms brought public through IPOs (Initial public offering) as a 
proxy for venture capital industry return in the previous year. They calculate both fund specific values, the 
market value of a firm brought public by a given venture capital organization, as well as annual aggregate 
industry values. 
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factor. Jeng and Wells (2000) find that industry returns
23
 are a driver of later stage venture 
capital investments. Kaplan and Schoar (2005) find that fund flows into venture capital are 
positively and significantly correlated with the prior year venture capital industry return, 
however the result for buyout funds is negative and insignificant
24
; they do not elaborate 
reasons for this.  
Factors excluded from my analysis 
The variables introduced next, are relevant for venture capital funds, however the link to 
buyout funds is weak, and thus the following variables are not included in my regressions.  
IPO activity - Jeng and Wells (2000) find that an IPO is the most attractive exit for a venture 
capitalist for two reasons. First, a survey by Venture Economics shows that exit through an 
IPO is the most profitable and second, in an IPO entrepreneur is able to regain control. Their 
result holds after controlling for reverse causality
25
. Black and Gilson (1997) add that a well-
developed stock market that permits venture capitalists to exit through an IPO is critical to the 
existence of a vibrant venture capital market. Also, Gompers and Lerner (1999) and Balboa 
and Marti (2003) find that increase in IPO activity is followed by an increase in fundraising. 
Conversely, as discussed in section 2, venture capital funds invest small stakes, while buyout 
funds seek for majority ownership and at divestment they seek to exit fully, thus trade sales 
being a better option for a buyout fund. Therefore, I exclude IPO activity in my study and the 
trade sales data specific for LBOs is difficult to access; even many of the prior papers 
excluded trade sales due to lack of data.  
R&D expenses - Gompers and Lerner (1999) argue that R&D expenses are a proxy for 
demand of venture capital by high-technology firms; higher R&D expenses mean that there is 
greater potential of entrepreneurs with promising ideas. They find that R&D expenses within 
a nation are positively related to venture capital inflow.  
Labor market rigidity - Labor market rigidity affects the free movement of resources. Jeng 
and Well (2000) provide an example from Japan, where changing an employment is 
                                              
23
 Jeng and Wells (2000) define industry returns by the total market value of IPOs divided by average GDP. 
24
 I will elaborate more on the relation on section 5.2 and present my results in section 7.1. 
25
 Jeng and Wells (2000) high levels of IPOs in a country will lead to more venture capital evidence from cross-
sectional regression and within regression. Danger of reverse causality; not that higher levels of IPOs will lead to 
increased funding amounts, but that higher levels of funding will eventually show up as higher levels of IPOs. 
They use shorter time periods to test for this and reject the reverse causality hypothesis. 
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considered dishonorable and individual may lose valuable social benefits. Rigidities of the 
labor market are widely discussed and considered to be one reason why venture capital is not 
as widespread in Europe as it is in US. 
Capital tax rate - a reduction in personal capital tax could either make venture capital more 
attractive for investors or attract more entrepreneurs to the industry. Poterba (1989), Gompers 
and Lerner (1999) and Jengs and Wells (2000) all find that reduction in capital gains tax does 
not affect the investors, possibly due to the rapid increase of tax-exempt institutional investors 
since 1978. However, Poterba (1989), Gompers and Lerner (1999) find more entrepreneurs to 
enter the market during times of low capital tax rate; making it relatively more attractive to 
start an own company than receiving a salary.  
Financial accounting standards - In a private equity deal, an extensive due diligence is 
carried out before the investment is made in a target company. Nevertheless, if the country in 
which the company operates has poor accounting standards, even a profound due diligence 
process does not reveal trustworthy results, therefore strict accounting standards should have 
a positive effect on the supply of funds. Jeng and Wells (2000) find the opposite; accounting 
standards are statistically significant at with negative coefficient. They argue that the proxy 
employed is not suitable for a private company.  
Investments and divestments – Results obtained by Balboa and Marti (2003) show that the 
lagged investment and divestment activity
26
 does have a positive and significant effect on the 
amount of funds raised. They conclude that the impact of investment and divestment is 
especially strong in countries with developing private equity markets, since lack of track 
record makes investors to use this type of information in order to conduct investment 
decisions. I am not including investments and divestments as a variable since it is highly 
correlated with the commitments and the accurate data for such a large sample as I have, is 
difficult to obtain.  
Aggregated domestic savings - Balboa and Marti (2003) include a proxy of liquidity for 
private equity funds; aggregate domestic savings as a percentage of GDP. They claim that 
                                              
26
 IPOs and sales to third parties are positive and significant, but divestments through write-off and buy-back 
have insignificant coefficients. However, as discussed above the study has been carried out only on aggregate 
country-level and they do not control for reverse causality as Jeng and Well (2000) do in their study; they fail to 
show whether the increase in investment-divestment activity actually leads to an increase in the private equity 
fundraising, or alternatively whether the increase in fundraising for some other reason results in private equity 
funds to invest and divest more.  
35 
 
 
aggregate domestic savings reflects the availability of fund for different investment purposes 
of which one is private equity funds. They find that the variable has positive and significant 
results. I excluded this due to lack of reliable data. 
3.5.2 Micro determinants 
Next I will discuss the fund-level factors affecting the fundraising volume. For fund-specific 
variables there is some prior evidence from buyout funds, mainly from Kaplan and Schoar 
(2005). The micro determinants introduced by prior literature are past performance, 
reputation, size of the fund and the time lag between the next and previous fund raised.  
Past performance and persistence of returns - Kaplan and Schoar (2005) show in their paper 
that higher previous fund returns are related to larger follow-on fund size. Furthermore, 
Gompers and Lerner (1999) find that it is more likely that a venture capital fund will be raised 
in a given year, when the previous fund returns have been positive. Prior literature on mutual 
funds shows that past fund returns
27
 do not explain well the future fund returns, so why would 
one invest in a private equity firm based on the past return of a fund. Academics argue that 
private equity funds have a learning curve, meaning that funds that outperform one year are 
also going outperform the following year due to the heterogeneity in GPs’ skills; (i) GPs have 
access to particular transactions “proprietary deal flow”, meaning that more skillful GPs are 
better able to invest in better investments, (ii) GPs usually provide advisory inputs along with 
capital (Kaplan and Schoar, 2005), (iii) venture capital funds are able to get better deals, 10-
14% discount on price, when negotiating with start-ups, since they provide substantial amount 
of management, advisory and reputational inputs (Hsu ,2004).  
Size of the fund - Kaplan and Schoar (2005) find that the GPs that perform well have larger 
funds and the fund size grows with time. Capital inflows increase in relation to past 
performance, but not linearly. The best performers grow slower, so the relationship is 
concave, because there is just not enough attractive deals and lack of GPs with the qualified 
skillset
28
. Also, Gompers and Lerner (1999) find that the firm performance has a strong effect 
on fundraising. The probability of raising a fund increases in relation to performance, but the 
                                              
27
 Gompers and Lerner (1999) measure performance with the market value of the equity held by venture capital 
firm that went public in a certain year. Kaplan and Schoar (2005) measure performance with IRR (internal rate 
of return) of the fund calculated by VE and fund’s cash flow, as well as PME (public market equivalent, which is 
cash flows discounted with stock market return). I will discuss my choice of proxy more in section 5.4. 
28
 Survey from LPs provides evidence that the top funds are highly oversubscribed and they choose to stay 
smaller (Kaplan and Schoar, 2005). 
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size of the fund is not affected by performance. Older firms are less likely to raise a new fund, 
however if a fund is raised, the fund will be larger than the previous one.  
Reputation  - Kaplan and Schoar (2005) suggest that the fund’s sequence number may pick up 
some features of fund quality and past performance, thus representing the reputation of the 
fund. Higher sequence number could indicate the survival of the fund, and therefore better 
performance. Additionally, Gompers and Lerner (1999) state that the sequence number may 
capture some future believes about the fund’s performance, which are not captured by current 
performance figures, because those do not give time perspective. According to Metrick and 
Yasuda (2010)  using sequence as a proxy for reputation is justified; if the current fund 
performs well then investors will interpret the performance as “skill” rather than “luck”.  
Years since previous fund raised - Gompers and Lerner (1999) argue that if the venture 
capital follow-on fund is raised too soon, it could be an indication of GPs greediness for 
management fees and thus marketing new fund too soon could be perceived negatively by 
investors.  
3.5.3 Fund performance and credit conditions 
Private equity performance is beyond the scope of this study. The aim of my study is to show 
the relation between buyout fundraising and credit market conditions. However, it would be 
interesting to see how the credit market conditions affect the performance of the fund sample  
that I obtain. Therefore, I run quick analysis on the performance of the fund and the prevailing 
credit conditions at the time the fund was raised following Axelson et al. (2010).  
 
The evidence from the relation between credit market conditions and fund’s performance is 
mixed. Phalippou and Zollo (2005) argue that corporate yields reflect the cost of buyout debt 
and that credit spreads capture the average expected likelihood of default and rates of 
recovery; as a result, both variables should have a negative impact on returns; meaning that 
when rates are high, returns are low. They find that when either credit spreads or corporate 
bond yields are low at the time investments are made, fund performance is higher. Ljungqvist 
et al. (2008) propose that the credit spread measures the tightness of credit markets and, 
therefore, lower spreads should correspond to higher returns. They find that Moody’s BAA 
corporate bond premium over risk-free rate at the time of investment has negative and 
significant effect on the investment of each portfolio company, implying that loose credit 
markets lead to higher returns. Axelson et al (2010) study credit spread at aggregate vintage-
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year level PME
29
 and fund level PME, and find in both cases that higher spread leads to 
higher returns, indicating that loose credit markets result in poorer performance, thus 
providing support for GP-LP agency conflict theory. There is also evidence from LBOs; 
Valkama et al (2013) find ambiguous and weak evidence of the credit spread and LBO 
transaction IRR %.  
Table 4 Summary of prior literature on PE fundraising 
 The table below presents the summary of private equity fundraising literature of macro and micro determinants. 
The literature is very limited and mostly focused to venture capital. First column presents the article- and journal 
name and number of references. Second column presents the author and year published. Third column shows 
time-period employed in the study. Fourth column presents the region focus. Fifth column is the fund type and 
last column is the source for the data. BO is buyout funds, VC is venture capital funds, PE is private equity 
funds; so both buyout and venture capital funds. 
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 PME = Public market equivalent 
Study Author 
Time 
period 
Region 
focus 
Funds Data 
The economics of private equity funds 
(The review of financial studies, Ref #231) 
Metrick and 
Yasuda (2010) 
1993-
2006  
N/A 
238 BO 
& VC 
funds 
Large investor 
Leveraged buyouts and private equity 
(Journal of Economic perspectives,  Ref  
#311) 
Kaplan and 
Strömberg 
(2009) 
1996-
2004  
US 43 LBOs CapitalIQ 
Private Equity Performance: Returns, 
Persistence, and Capital Flows (Journal of 
Finance,  Ref #848) 
Kaplan and 
Schoar (2005) 
1980-
2001 
Not 
disclosed 
PE 
Venture 
Economics 
Illiquidity puzzle: theory and evidence 
from private equity (Journal of Financial 
Economics,  Ref #149) 
Lerner and 
Schoar (2004) 
1946-
2001  
US 
243 
funds 
Large investor 
An integrative approach to the 
determinants of PE fundraising (Working 
paper Ref #10) 
Balboa & 
Marti (2003)  
1987-
2000 
Western 
EU 
Country-
level 
EVCA 
The determinants of VE funding; evidence 
across countries (Journal of Corporate 
Finance Ref #276) 
Jeng & Wells 
(2000) 
1986-
1995 
21 
countries 
N/A 
Venture 
Associations 
Venture Capital and Capital gains taxation 
(Working paper,  Ref #227) 
 
Poterba (1989) 
1977-
1987 
US, UK, 
Canada 
VC 
Venture 
Economics 
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4 HYPOTHESES  
Based on the literature review presented above, it is fair to assume that availability of debt 
financing and cost of debt potentially drives the commitments into buyout funds. Capital 
structure theories suggest that average credit spreads are negatively related to investment 
activity by buyout funds, transaction prices, and leverage. Tradeoff theory and adjusted 
present value theories argue that investors should take into account financial side effects such 
as tax and interest incentives when maximizing the value of their investments. Additionally, 
when the cost of debt decreases it drives down the required rate of return of investment and 
thus makes the target more attractive from valuation perspective. Mispricing theory suggests 
that occasionally, there exists mispricing between cost of equity and cost of debt that 
investors are able to arbitrarily benefit from.  Also, prior empirical evidence on credit spread 
represents support that the leverage in LBO transactions is more driven by the economic-wide 
cost of debt than firm specific characteristics. To conclude, when the credit conditions are 
favorable, individual investment targets become more attractive increasing the potential 
investment portfolio set available for buyout funds, and additionally favorable credit markets 
should also provide liquidity and access to financing, thus the GPs should be more desirous of 
raising a buyout fund.  
H 1: More capital is committed into buyout funds when the credit markets are loose  
Agency conflict theory suggests that buyout leverage is more driven by market factors than 
firm-specific characteristics; when credit markets are loose and access to debt is easy and 
interest rates are low, the GPs have a tendency to increase the value of their option-like 
compensation scheme by investing more and making them more willing to overpay for the 
targets relative to the fundamental value.  Capital structure theories provide further support 
why leverage and cost of debt make such a difference for buyout funds and suggest that credit 
conditions could be a driver for buyout fundraising. I aim to show support that economy-wide 
debt market conditions should explain buyout fundraising better than cross-sectional GP 
characteristics; meaning that when credit conditions are loose more GPs will be raising funds 
despite of their firm specific characteristics. 
H2: Loose credit conditions should lead to more commitments into buyout funds despite the 
firm specific characteristics 
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Prior literature suggests that there are differences between funds raised by new entrants and 
established firms. Kaplan and Schoar (2005) find that more first-time private equity funds are 
raised by new entrants after periods in which the stock market performed well. Furthermore, 
they find that venture capital partnership are started more aggressively after periods in which 
the venture capital industry performed well and that also first-time funds tend to raise larger 
funds. However, the results were insignificant for buyout funds, which might be due to the 
very low sample size. Therefore, I aim to study the timing of first-time buyout funds and 
hypothesize that more first-time buyout funds
30
 will be raised after a period of low credit 
spreads and high market returns. 
H3: New entrants are pro-cyclical 
Table 5 Summary of hypotheses 
  
                                              
30
 First-time buyout fund means that this is the first buyout fund raised by a particular GP  
Macro determinants of buyout fundraising volume 
H1 More capital is committed into buyout funds when the credit markets are loose 
H2 
Loose credit conditions should lead to more commitments into buyout funds despite firm specific 
characteristics 
H3 New entrants are pro-cyclical 
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5 DATA 
I use two complementary databases VentureXpert (VE) and Preqin. From VE I obtain 5,420 
new buyout funds raised between 1980-2011 and from Preqin 1,273 buyout funds. Thus, VE 
is more suitable for aggregate-level analysis, however I am not able to access the funds’ 
performance figures through VE, and thus I am using Preqin to conduct the fund-level 
analysis such as controlling for the performance of previous fund. 
VentureXpert is employed by Kaplan and Schoar (2005), Balboa and Marti (2003), Jeng and 
Wells (2000), Gompers and Lerner (1999) and Poterba (1989). VentureXpert
TM
 (VE) is a 
database of Venture Economics, which is a Thomson Financial company. Venture Economics 
collects quarterly information on individual funds in the private equity industry. The data set 
is based on voluntary reporting of fund information by the GPs as well as by their LPs. 
Kaplan and Schoar (2005) argue that according to Venture Economics there is “little 
opportunity for inconsistent reporting”, since they receive information from both GPs and 
LPs. Venture Economics estimates that this data set covers 70% of the overall private equity 
market. Obviously, Venture economics database is prone to self-reporting and survivor 
biases; fund managers that fail to raise a fund do not likely report and poorly performing 
funds are reporting less frequently. However, reporting by LPs should make up for this to 
some extent. I also compare my set of funds to those of prior literature during the same time 
periods and it seems that VE has complemented their database, since I obtain more funds than 
the previous studies. This could be true, since the LPs are requiring better reporting, and funds 
may be more willing to report and thus increase their level of transparency to gain investors.  
Preqin database is fairly new, founded in 2003 and thus not yet widely used in the prior 
literature.  However, some of the most recent studies for example Axelson et al (2010) use 
Preqin’s data to study determinants of LBO leverage levels and performance. Table 6 
compares VE and Preqin on an aggregate fundraisings level. As we see from Table 6, Preqin 
covers approximately 60% of VE’s funds in dollar terms, however only about 23% in number 
of funds; meaning that Preqin presents fairly well the total buyout fund universe in terms of 
larger funds, however there is inconsistent performance reporting among the smallest funds.  
However, as Table 6 presents, Preqin does not significantly deviate from VE’s data, except 
for the data in early 1980s which includes larger variation however then the dollar amounts 
were fairly small, thus not affecting the overall analysis. I also ran some manual checks on the 
figures and the data seem to be accurate.  
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Table 6 Comparison of VE and Preqin databases 
The table below compares the Venture Economics (VE) and Preqin databases. Panel A presents the aggregate 
annual fundraising volumes in US$billions in 2011 dollars for both databases. Panel B presents the aggregate 
number of new funds raised for both databases. In both panels, the third column shows Preqin's observations in 
relation to VE. 
Aggregate volume of funds raised in US and Europe    
 Panel A: (US$bil in 2011 dollars)  Panel B: (Number of new funds) 
Vintage VE Preqin Preqin as a  VE Preqin Preqin as a 
Year   % of VE    % of VE 
1980 0 1 261 %  10 4 40 % 
1981 1 0 0 %  16 0 0 % 
1982 1 1 69 %  25 1 4 % 
1983 6 0 7 %  32 3 9 % 
1984 7 3 39 %  36 6 17 % 
1985 7 1 12 %  44 4 9 % 
1986 16 4 23 %  53 12 23 % 
1987 38 16 41 %  85 10 12 % 
1988 30 11 38 %  94 17 18 % 
1989 32 13 41 %  133 14 11 % 
1990 24 11 44 %  106 22 21 % 
1991 15 5 34 %  55 11 20 % 
1992 24 15 61 %  95 22 23 % 
1993 43 11 25 %  112 22 20 % 
1994 51 56 109 %  133 41 31 % 
1995 56 25 45 %  138 31 22 % 
1996 60 28 46 %  131 38 29 % 
1997 126 67 53 %  213 58 27 % 
1998 147 107 73 %  234 69 29 % 
1999 120 79 66 %  239 61 26 % 
2000 173 136 79 %  275 89 32 % 
2001 150 75 50 %  279 47 17 % 
2002 98 73 75 %  202 49 24 % 
2003 91 73 80 %  195 46 24 % 
2004 115 80 70 %  221 51 23 % 
2005 313 178 57 %  350 100 29 % 
2006 424 307 72 %  359 104 29 % 
2007 470 317 68 %  429 106 25 % 
2008 350 192 55 %  418 91 22 % 
2009 142 73 51 %  248 46 19 % 
2010 75 41 55 %  207 46 22 % 
2011 194 109 56 %  253 52 21 % 
Total 3 400 2 106   5 420 1 273  
Sources: International Financial statistics, Venture Economics and Preqin 
Panel A: US$bil in 2011 dollars      Panel B: Number of new funds raised  
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5.1 The sample collection process 
My sample of funds will focus purely on buyout funds and I exclude all other funds from the 
statistics such as venture capital, generalist funds, mezzanine funds, infrastructure funds, real 
estate funds, distress debt funds, primary funds-of-funds, and secondary funds-of-funds. I also 
exclude mezzanine because they have a different investment strategy compared to buyout 
funds, they offer financing between company’s senior debt and equity for companies, even 
though one could hypothesize that also their activity is related strongly to credit market 
conditions. They invest actual debt stakes in companies, while buyout funds lend the money 
from outsiders and invest it in the portfolio companies’ balance sheet and thus avoid the direct 
exposure themselves. VentureXpert sample is obtained from private equity funds database 
(VIFD) and I obtain 7,700  buyout funds.  
My study is based on a time period of 1980-2011, since prior to 1980 reporting is less 
frequent and I observe on average less than 5 funds per country per year, which is too small 
sample size in order to get high enough confidence levels. After I exclude all the funds raised 
prior to 1980, I obtain 7,283 buyout funds and by removing the funds raised during 2012-13, I 
obtain in total 6,957 buyout funds. I remove the vintage years of 2012-2013 due to lack of 
macroeconomic data such as GDP figures. 
Next, I will limit my data according to country focus to markets which are in my interest; 
Europe and North America according to firm nation, and furthermore, I exclude funds with 
investment focus on countries like Cayman Islands due to the tax haven nature of the country.  
I mostly include European countries which belong to OECD due to better accessibility to 
reliable data. This reduces the sample size to 5,420. 
For Preqin, I start altogether with 1,468 buyout funds. Then I control for the region factor and 
the sample reduces to 1,273 buyout funds raised between 1980-2011 in Europe and North 
America, which resembles approximately one quarter of the VE sample. After balancing the 
Preqin data with years when no fund was raised, I end up with a balanced panel data set of 
13,299 observations for 403 private equity firms which have raised buyout funds.  
5.2 Descriptive statistics 
In this section, I cover the descriptive statistics which are relevant to my study. Moreover I 
will be comparing the data obtained from the two databases, since much of the fund-level 
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analysis such as the probability of raising a fund, fund size, the probability of raising a follow-
on fund and micro-level analysis are dependent on the less-comprehensive Preqin database. 
Of course, as a robustness check I have run the analysis with both samples, however VE 
sample does not allow me to control for the fund’s performances.  
For the aggregate level analysis I use VE data, since it is more comprehensive. In Figure 4, I 
compare the aggregate levels of buyout fundraising to merger waves and LBO transactions to 
get confidence for my data set in relation to some well-known corporate finance patterns. The 
co-movement of three various corporate finance waves is obvious, buyout fundraising pattern 
following closely the merger waves. Moreover, the recent buyout boom is obvious from the 
graph.  
 
Figure 4 Development of M&As, LBOs and commitments into buyout funds 
The figure below compares the three various corporate waves; merger waves  in terms of annual transaction 
value, leveraged buyout (LBO) waves in terms of transaction value and buyout fundraising waves in terms of 
capital commitments into buyout funds . The figures are presented in US$billion in 2011 dollars, inflation 
adjusted. Source: Thomson  
 
Table 7 shows the same aggregate fundraising volumes as in Table 6 however in number of 
funds by comparing the data obtained from Preqin and VE, more clearly presenting the 
observation noted above that the Preqin sample includes on average larger funds. Moreover, 
the maximum fund size figures are generally consistent bringing more confidence that Preqin 
presents fairly well the buyout fund universe in terms of larger funds. Even though, some of 
the fund characteristics vary a little across the databases. 
Figure 5 reveals that overall trend between number of funds and average fund size is similar; 
when capital inflow into buyout funds increases also the average fund size increases.  
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Figure 5 Comparison of fund-level characteristics 
The chart present the average fund size in US$billion in 2011 dollars and the number of new BO (buyout) funds 
raised per vintage year. Panel A present the statistics for sample obtained from Preqin and Panel B presents for 
VentureXpert (VE). The figures include the sample used in the analysis, thus only US, Canada and selected 
countries from Europe. Vertical bars present the number of BO funds observed within the database, dotted line 
presents the average fund size, horizontal black bars present loose credit markets; measured with Moody’s BAA 
corporate bond spread over risk-free rate. I have only included years in which the spread increased; the higher 
the horizontal black bar, the lower the spread, presenting favorable credit market conditions. 
Total aggregate fundraising in US and Europe 
Panel A - Preqin sample       Panel B - VE sample 
    
This implies that when capital liquidity is high and there are more funds raised then also more 
capital is allocated to funds, thus the average fund size increases. Moreover, we see from the 
graph that the time periods which are featured with loose credit market conditions such as the 
birth of junk bonds in 1985-88 and birth of CDOs in 2003-2006 are featured with above 
average fund sizes. Moreover, even though the Preqin data contains larger funds on average 
the two graphs represent the same trend, therefore the use of Preqin data is justified for fund 
size analysis and I expect significant results, however the magnitude of the result could be 
overestimated. The statistical analysis for the fund size is reported in section 7.3.1. 
So far, I have compared the aggregate volume, number of new funds raised per vintage year 
and fund size. Next, in Figure 6 and in Figure 7 I present the relation between credit market 
conditions and funds raised split to first-time buyout funds and follow-on funds, by number of 
funds and dollar amount of capital raised by the funds. Figure 6 presents a strong relation 
between the number of funds and credit market conditions; when the credit spread is below 
average the number of funds increases substantially and vice versa. The correlation seems to 
be true for both first-time and follow-on funds, however number of follow-on funds has 
grown significantly more. The statistical analyses for the new entrants are presented in section 
7.1.2. 
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Table 7 Comparison of fund-level characteristics 
The number of observations indicates the total number of new funds raised per vintage year and average and 
maximum fund sizes in US$mil 2011 dollars for these funds. "Liq. funds" refers to a number of liquidated funds 
as of vintage year. "Avg" size refers to the average fund size and "Max size" to the largest fund size in that 
particular vintage year in US$ millions in 2011 dollars. For Preqin data, I also report the average, max and min 
IRR for the vintage year. IRR is Internal Rate of Return net of fees. 
  Venture Economics   Preqin             
Vintage Total Liq. Avg. Max  Total Liq. Avg. Max Avg. Max Min 
Year Obs. funds Size Size  Obs. funds Size Size IRR IRR IRR 
             
1980 10 4 122 179  4 4 318 947 N/A N/A N/A 
1981 16 6 84 174  0 0 0 0 N/A N/A N/A 
1982 25 10 77 343  1 1 750 750 39.2 39.2 39.2 
1983 32 18 284 1 249  3 3 214 250 15.8 41 -2 
1984 36 22 257 2 120  6 6 528 2 120 32.9 96.2 7.3 
1985 44 20 253 1 543  4 4 306 366 13.4 27 5.1 
1986 53 31 380 4 267  12 12 328 1 353 49.5 280 3.7 
1987 85 45 629 10 954  10 10 1 736 11 991 19.6 31.3 6.8 
1988 94 64 383 3 584  17 15 904 3 559 18.8 54.3 4.7 
1989 132 82 266 1 942  14 14 735 2 303 30.5 64 11.4 
1990 106 70 226 1 953  22 22 518 2 885 22.2 72 2.4 
1991 55 34 311 3 293  11 11 398 1 399 29.1 54.7 -0.5 
1992 95 45 348 2 977  22 21 740 3 639 19.4 58.1 -49.9 
1993 112 58 443 3 042  22 17 479 1 149 21.1 58 -1.9 
1994 133 91 400 3 066  41 33 969 11 423 22.8 92.2 -22.6 
1995 138 67 507 6 869  31 23 728 2 717 16.6 59.9 -19.9 
1996 131 56 483 4 445  38 21 653 3 883 16.6 147.4 -19.6 
1997 213 81 641 8 999  58 37 1 040 9 000 9.4 84 -21.6 
1998 234 89 662 6 069  69 27 1 255 5 956 5.9 31.3 -100 
1999 239 85 579 10 641  61 16 1 112 5 101 10.3 35.7 -25.1 
2000 274 39 747 8 935  89 12 1 393 8 730 17.7 41.6 -9.2 
2001 279 30 777 8 529  47 6 1 183 5 537 23.7 46.9 -11.6 
2002 202 11 552 8 244  49 3 1 054 5 845 21.1 72 -13.4 
2003 195 8 587 8 680  46 1 1 335 8 680 16.8 57 -86.2 
2004 221 5 589 8 319  51 1 1 211 7 488 17.0 80 -17.3 
2005 350 5 882 12 700  100 1 1 466 10 768 13.0 76.9 -7.5 
2006 359 2 1 207 26 630  104 0 2 461 26 630 6.5 30.4 -25.2 
2007 429 4 1 120 24 210  106 1 2 293 24 210 9.4 43 -28 
2008 418 0 912 23 101  91 0 1 708 22 019 12.7 48.7 -31.1 
2009 248 1 775 12 956  46 0 1 413 5 965 12.6 91.5 -28 
2010 207 0 459 4 155  46 0 772 4 566 2.4 46.8 -59.5 
2011 253 0 846 16 000  52 0 1 735 16 200 N/A N/A N/A 
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Figure 6 Credit market conditions and number of first-time funds 
The figure below shows the number of new entries into buyout market, which is defined as new GPs established 
or GPs that have previously focused on other asset class and have decided to raise their first BO fund. Credit 
market conditions are measured with Moody’s BAA corporate bond spread over risk-free rate. Source:VE.
 
In Figure 7, it is shown the relation between credit market condition and dollar value of 
capital raised by new entrants. The negative relation is obvious for follow-on funds, and it 
seems from the chart that also the capital raised by first time funds peeks when credit spread 
is low. However, while the capital raised by follow-on funds over time presents tremendous 
growth, the first-time funds illustrate flat growth. The danger in here is that there could be a 
severe misreporting by the first-time funds, which perform poorly and fail to raise a follow-on 
fund. It seems surprising that over 30-year time period the growth of first-time buyout funds 
is flat, while follow-on funds present tremendous growth.  
Figure 7 Credit market conditions and capital raised by first-time funds 
The figure below shows the capital raised by the new entries into buyout market, which is defined as new GPs 
established or GPs that have previously focused on other asset class and have decided to raise first BO fund. 
Credit market conditions are measured with Moody’s BAA corporate bond spread over risk-free rate. 
Source:VE. 
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Furthermore, the entry of first-time buyout funds could be driven by completely different set 
of factors than what drives the decision of raising a follow-on fund. The decision for a person 
to establish a GP or for an existing GP that focuses in some other asset class e.g. venture 
capital, to enter the buyout market could be potentially driven by factors related to  the 
industrial factors or alternatively personal preferences. The prior literature indicated that new 
entrants should be pro-cyclical and based on the graphs it seems that the number of new 
entrants correlates with credit market conditions, whereas the capital raised by new entries 
seems to have insignificant relation. We will see whether the results hold after controlling for 
all the other factors. 
5.2.1 Defining buyout waves 
Prior literature on buyout fundraising waves relies on graphs and figures to identify the 
waves, thus I make an effort to use a more sophisticated effort following the method by 
Harford (2005). I collect all the buyout funds raised 1982-2012 from Thomson Financial’s 
Securities Data Company (SDC). I split the observations into three periods
31
; 1980s, 1990s 
and 2000s, since all the period are characterized with different type of waves; 1980s are 
featured with junk bonds, 1990s with dot-com boom and 2000s with CDOs (Collateralized 
debt obligations). Based on Mitchell and Mulherin (1996) , I will study the waves in two-year 
periods
32
. Thus, for each decade, I calculate the highest two-year concentration of the funds 
raised. This two-year period is identified as a potential wave. I simulate 1000 times the total 
number of funds raised over the entire decade by assigning each occurrence equal probability 
1/10 for each year. Next, I take the maximum two-year concentration from my simulation and 
compare it to the actual concentration. If the actual peak concentration exceeds the peak of 
empirical distribution, the period is considered as a fundraising wave. 
My result of the simulation are shown in Figure 8 indicating that there occurred two-year 
waves during 1989-90, 2000-2001 and 2007-2008. During the period of 1982-1992, 31% of 
the funds were raised within a two-year period starting in 1989-90. Out of the 1000 
simulations of the 754 bids the maximum concentration was 29%. In 2002-2012, the actual 
maximum concentration out of 3044 new funds raised occurred in 2007-2008 presenting 28%, 
                                              
31
 I have identified the decades followingly, since there was not much activity in early 1980s and  moreover, 
because the waves occur in the turn of the year; 1980s = 1982-1992, 1990s = 1992-2002, 2000s = 2002-2012 
32
 I also study the waves in three-year periods and get the same results, however I only report the two-year 
results. 
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while the simulation yielded maximum concentration of 24%. In the 1980s, the peak of actual 
concentration exceeds that of the simulation over two-year period, in 2000s the maximum 
concentration extends over a three-year period; indicating that the wave lasted longer.  
Figure 8 Buyout fundraising wave simulation 
The graph below presents the maximum two-year concentration of a simulated buyout fundraising by assigning 
equal probabilities for each funds and the actual average two-year concentration. The actual two-year 
concentration in number of buyout funds exceeds the simulation in 1989-90, 2000-2001 and 2007-2008 
indicating that there occurred two-year waves during these periods. 
 
5.3 Size of buyout markets 
Prior literature has been mainly focusing on US and UK, with a few additional articles on 
Western Europe and maturing private equity markets. Balboa and Marti (2003)
33
 include in 
their study 17 Western European countries such as Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland and UK. Jeng and Wells (2000) include 21 countries, in addition to 
Balboa and Marti (2003) they add Australia, Canada, Israel, Japan, New Zealand, US and 
exclude Greece from their sample. I include 20 European countries in my analysis; Austria, 
Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, 
Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, UK  
and also Canada and US.  
                                              
33
 Balboa and Marti (2003) European countries included (1987-2000 with following exceptions): Austria (1991-
1992), Greece (1987-1990, 1993-1994), Finland, Iceland, Norway (1987) 
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Table 8 shows the size of each country’s buyout market in relation to its GDP. As expected, 
mature markets such as UK and US are the largest buyout markets with buyout market 
comprising 10-20% of GDP and maturing markets are around 1-2%. Interestingly, Sweden 
stands out with 6-8% buyout market as of GDP, due to large PE firms such as Altor and 
Nordic Capital, which raised over USD 2 billion in 2008 and nearly USD 6 billion, 
respectively. Prior literature from early 2000 (Karaömerlioglu and Jacobsson), also shows 
evidence that Sweden has been actively developing its private equity market. Furthermore, 
Luxembourg has significantly large buyout market due to its tax haven nature. Overall, the 
two databases yield similar results, however there are some differences in individual 
countries.  
Table 8 The size of the buyout market in relation to GDP 
Table below indicates the size of a buyout fund market in every respective country with VE and Preqin 
databases. BO /GDP is the aggregate amount of buyout funds raised in a given country divided by the country's 
GDP in a given vintage year and all the vintage years from 1980-2011 are summed together. As a % of total is 
calculated by summing all the countries together and every country's BO market size is divided by the total 
amount. 
VE         Preqin     
# Country 
BO / 
GDP 
As  a % of the 
total   # Country 
BO / 
GDP 
As  a % of the 
total 
1 United Kingdom 0.1725 28 %  1 United Kingdom 0.1370 27 % 
2 United States 0.1281 21 %  2 Luxembourg 0.1038 21 % 
3 Canada 0.0656 11 %  3 United States 0.0834 17 % 
4 Sweden 0.0558 9 %  4 Sweden 0.0790 16 % 
5 Luxembourg 0.0327 5 %  5 Poland 0.0165 3 % 
6 Finland 0.0269 4 %  6 France 0.0125 2 % 
7 France 0.0264 4 %  7 Canada 0.0121 2 % 
8 Netherlands 0.0247 4 %  8 Netherlands 0.0113 2 % 
9 Switzerland 0.0170 3 %  9 Norway 0.0081 2 % 
10 Denmark 0.0141 2 %  10 Switzerland 0.0072 1 % 
11 Norway 0.0120 2 %  11 Denmark 0.0070 1 % 
12 Portugal 0.0089 1 %  12 Finland 0.0066 1 % 
13 Spain 0.0080 1 %  13 Italy 0.0035 1 % 
14 Italy 0.0077 1 %  14 Ukraine 0.0033 1 % 
15 Belgium 0.0068 1 %  15 Germany 0.0031 1 % 
16 Germany 0.0067 1 %  16 Spain 0.0022 0 % 
17 Poland 0.0045 1 %  17 Turkey 0.0017 0 % 
18 Austria 0.0025 0 %  18 Greece 0.0015 0 % 
19 Greece 0.0018 0 %  19 Estonia 0.0015 0 % 
20 Hungary 0.0000 0 %  20 Portugal 0.0007 0 % 
21 Iceland 0.0000 0 %      
22 Ireland 0.0000 0 %           
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5.4 Variables 
This section presents the variables chosen for this study and explains some of the choices 
made. 
Credit conditions proxy - Following Ljungvist, Richardson and Wolfenzon (2008), my credit 
market variable includes BAA corporate bond spread, defined as Moody’s BAA corporate 
bond return minus risk-free rate, which I have calculated from 10-year government bond rate. 
Ljungvist et al (2008) assume that a low yield spread implies loose credit conditions and 
“easy” access to credit. Obviously, also many other factors impact the credit conditions, 
however yield spread is extensively used in the prior literature as a proxy for the tightness of 
credit, since it conditions on credit rating.  
Previous literature has mainly used two different proxies to measure credit market conditions. 
Ljungvist et al (2008) and Maula et al (2013) use BAA-AAA corporate bond return
34
 and 
Axelson et al (2010) use high yield spread as a proxy for credit market conditions. I use 
logarithm of year-to-year change in the credit spread. The absolute level of credit spread tells 
little about the easing or tightening of credit spread, however the relative change from year to 
the next gives better view. If we take a look at the Figure 6 on page 46, we see clearly from 
the graph that the amount of new entrants is at the same level during dot-com boom as during 
the CDS boom, while during the early 2000 the credit spread is around 3%; being at the all-
time high over the previous decade and in the mid-2000 it represented all-time low during the 
past decade. Thus, the credit spread as an absolute figure is not representative proxy and a 
change in credit spread proxies better the easing or tightening of credit market conditions. 
Prior literature from venture capital funds mainly uses macro-economic proxies with one-year 
lag to assess the impact of macro factors to fundraising due to the sticky supply of funds and 
the average time of six to twelve months that it takes to raise a fund. Some of the critiques fall 
upon the proxies used; even though lagged variables indicate certain relation between 
independent and dependent variables, the current year proxies may not. I regress the Moody’s 
BAA corporate bond spread over risk-free rate at the time the fund was raised as well as the 
absolute change in corporate credit spread the year fund was raised and one year prior. The 
outcome indicates that the absolute change in corporate credit spread is a significant driver at 
                                              
34
 Ljungvist et al (2008) use BAA-AAA corporate bond return over risk-free rate and Maula et al. (2013) use the 
average Barclay’s 5-10 year sterling non-gilt corporate BBB-AAA par rate  
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1% confidence level as expected. Additionally, the current year measures are both also 
negative, even though insignificant, implying that decrease in corporate credit spread is a 
major trigger for buyout fundraising at aggregate-level, and at the time fund is raised, the 
credit market conditions remain loose, even though they are not a significant driver.  
State of economy - I will test the economic health hypothesis by including real growth in 
country’s GDP as a proxy to measure the state of country’s economy. I use log current and 
past 12 month stock market returns of capitalization weighted indices such as S&P  500 for 
US and FTSE All-share Index for Europe to measure stock returns.  
Logarithm correction - Logs should be taken of variable that are expected to grow 
exponentially like GDP, but not of variables that fluctuate around fixed level such as interest 
rates. Therefore, I use log return of GDP and market return. The first differences are taken of 
BAA and high yield corporate bonds and T-bill rate, because the data is exposed to a severe 
trend and without detrending the regression would be spurious
35
. The only disadvantage with 
taking first differences is that one level of degrees of freedom will be lost. Additionally, the 
interpretation of the variables may be difficult (Brooks). The interest rate variables are 
defined followingly: 
Xt = xt − xt−1      (1) 
Performance of a fund - When assessing the performance of a fund, three various metrics are 
usually used; internal rate of return (IRR), distributions to paid-in capital (DPI) or total value 
to paid-in capital (TVPI). I chose IRR as a main measure of performance, since generally LPs 
follow the IRR performance measure, which provides an easy comparison to their other 
public investments.  
Industry performance - Moreover, I use pooled IRR %
36
 to measure the aggregate buyout 
industry performance, since it provides more accurate measure than average IRR. I estimate 
the industry IRR following Gombers and Lerner (1999), by tracking down the previous funds 
raised by a GP at a given vintage year and taking value weighted average over all such funds. 
At aggregate level, this IRR percentage should reflect the average historic return for GPs that 
managed to raise a fund at a current year. I compare my industry returns to vintage year 
                                              
35
 Spurious regression refers to a a regression in which a unit root is present (Brooks). 
36
 Pooled IRR is a IRR of a portfolio for several funds calculated by combining the cashflow, which is then used 
to calculate the IRR. Thus, providing a better measurement then average IRR which may not give an accurate 
picture of overall performance. 
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returns calculated by VE over the total universe of buyout funds, and the overall trend is 
similar, expect I have more variation, especially in the earlier years due to fewer observations. 
The early 1980s returns are featured with all time high pooled-IRRs close to 40%, after that 
there occurs a significant drop in the level of returns in 1986. My data excludes some of the 
worst performing funds, since the overall level of returns quickly rebounds in the early 1990s. 
My data and VE similarly illustrate the second large drop in 1995, which continues all the 
way to early 2000s when started tech-boom and momentarily the funds’ performances shoot 
back up to all-time highs. This did not last for long, after a peak in 2001, returns started 
steadily to decline hitting the bottom in 2006 and after that staying at low levels. For 
illustrative purposes later on, I also include the aggregate level of fund raised in the Figure 9 
on page 62. As the figure strongly indicates, there might be negative relation between the two, 
however I am going to statistically examine this in the results section.  
The private equity industry is getting more competitive and reaching high returns gets more 
difficult. As Figure 9  illustrates in the early 1980s, the pooled average IRRs were in the 
heights of 40% and the fundraising volumes were at low dozen billion dollars raised. In 
1990s, the first hundred billion dollars was raised and the pooled average IRRs dropped to 
mid-20%. In 2000s, nearly 300 billion dollars was committed to buyout funds and the IRRs 
were on average between 15-20% and furthermore, in 2006 all-time high 470 billion dollars 
was raised in US and Europe together and the returns have simultaneously hit rock bottom at 
level of below 10%. So overall, while the buyout industry aggregate level pooled-IRRs have 
declined over-time, the aggregate fundraising levels have gone up. The previous literature 
supports this view, by showing that a capital inflow into buyout industry drives down the 
returns (Kaplan and Schoar, 2005). Of course, the buyout industry performance variates with 
up and downs, but on average the pooled-IRR% has declined steadily across the buyout 
industry. Alternative explanation is that I do not simply observe the correct pooled-IRR% 
figures, which would reflect the perception of funds’ returns by investors at the time. As we 
know, it takes multiple years for returns to materialize and due to poor access to historic 
numbers it is difficult to estimate the perception of industry returns back then, especially 
when the reporting was even more insufficient than now.  
Treasury bill - I also include return of Treasury bonds, which represents alternative 
investment choice; when the interest rate goes up, more available capital flows into Treasury 
bonds and less goes to private equity. However, the results should be interpreted with care, 
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since the Treasury bill returns have declined significantly over time and it might be that due to 
the low level of return, it no more presents alternative investment choice to private equity.  
Pension funds - In my analysis, I add the pension fund assets as of GDP as an independent 
variable, since it is one of the key determinants of private equity fund level variation between 
countries. I obtain the pension fund assets as a percentage of GDP for 2001-2011. The data 
includes all types of plans occupational and personal, mandatory and voluntary arrangements, 
additionally both funded and book reserved pension plans are included. The data includes 
plans where benefits are paid by a private sector entity (classified as private pension plans by 
the OECD) as well as those paid by a funded public sector entity.  
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Table 9 Summary of variables 
The table below presents the variables used in this thesis and describes  how the variables are obtained and 
provides the source for each variable. 
Variable Description Sources 
Dependent variables 
BO funds raised  Total aggregate buyout funds raised in mil$ in 2011 dollars 
 Total number of funds raised 
Thomson 
VentureXpert/Preqin 
New entrants  Number of new buyout funds raised by new partnership or 
players previously been focusing on other fields (e.g. venture 
capital funds) 
Thomson 
VentureXpert 
Net-of fees IRR%  Net of fees IRR% for a specific fund 
 Pooled Net of fees IRR% on an annual aggregate level basis 
Preqin 
Net-of fees IRR% 
benchmarked 
 IRR difference to benchmark is the difference between fund's net 
of fees IRR% to equivalent market benchmark according to 
geographic focus and vintage year. 
Preqin 
Explanatory variables 
GDP growth  Country specific gross domestic product annually International 
Financial Statistics 
Market 
capitalization 
growth 
 Annual percentage change in market capitalization (e.g. 
1.1.2011-31.12.2012) calculated based on unadjusted index. For 
Europe I use  FTSE-ALL shares index and for US S&P 500 
Thomson Financial 
Datastream 
Market return  Calculated based on dividend adjusted index. For Europe I use  
FTSE-ALL shares index and for US S&P 500 
Thomson Financial 
Datastream 
Credit market 
conditions  
 Moody’s BAA corporate bond index over risk free rate  
 BofA Merrill Lynch high yield Index Total Return over risk free 
rate (Risk free rate measured with 10-year government bond 
yield) 
Federal Reserve 
Economic Data 
T-Bill  One-year government bill return for a given country Datastream 
Pension levels  Total pension assets and liabilities at country-level; proxy for the 
size of country’s pension funds (Data available 2003-2011) 
OECD iLibrary 
Industry IRR  Industry IRR is calculated following Gompers and Lerner (1999). 
I estimate the "value-weighted IRR of previous funds" by 
tracking previous fund of every fund in a given vintage year 
raised by a given firm, and then taking value-weighted average 
IRR of those funds for that particular vintage year 
Preqin 
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6 METHODOLOGY 
This section introduces the methodology used in this thesis. One of my main contributions to 
the existing literature is the use of more sophisticated methods, since prior papers which have 
focused on the buyout fundraising patterns, have been criticized of their poor methodologies 
used potentially resulting in unreliable results. Therefore, I aim to control for truncation and 
selection bias in my sample, additionally I obtain fund-level data and thus, my analysis on the 
credit market conditions are controlled for firm specific factors; meaning that the coefficients 
should be robust and reliable.   
6.1 Panel-data methodology 
A panel-data methodology is used since I have data comprising both time series and cross-
sectional elements; employing information across both time and space. Panel data contains 
observations on multiple phenomena observed over multiple time periods for the same firms 
or individuals. Importantly, a panel keeps the same entities and measures some specific 
quantity about them over time. Econometrically, the setup I have is described in the following 
equation 
   (2)  
where γit is the dependent variable, α is the intercept term, β is a k x 1 vector of parameters to 
be estimated on the explanatory variables, and xit is a 1 x k vector of observations on the 
explanatory variable.  
Panel data methodology offers several advantages. First, I can address a broader range of 
issues and tackle more complex problems with panel data than would be possible with pure 
time-series or pure cross-sectional data alone. It allows to control for the effects of variables 
that specifically affect the dependent variable of each fund but are unobservable (the co-called 
individual heterogeneity); meaning that the coefficients estimated reflect the real impact of x 
on γ. Second, this larger amount of information allows increasing the degree of freedom of the 
tests and mitigates the problems of multicollinearity among the explanatory variables. Third, 
it can resolve certain forms of the problem of omitted variables bias in regression results, 
when structured in an correct way. 
TtNiuxa ititit ...,2,1 ; ,...,2,1             
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6.2 Fixed-effect model 
I choose fixed effects model over random effects model, since my selection of countries is not 
random; I focus on a selected European and North American countries and moreover, f ixed-
effects model suits well for analyzing the impact of variables that vary over time; as in this 
case the return on Moody’s BAA corporate bond and other macro-economic data. Fixed-
effects method allows to control for variables that cannot be observed or  measured such as 
cultural factors or difference in business practices across companies; or variables that change 
over time but not across entities (i.e. national policies, federal regulations, taxation). 
Therefore, its greatest advantage is that it controls for omitted variables. However, the fixed 
effects model does not control for unobserved variables that change over time. So, for 
example a failure to include GPD in the model could still cause coefficients of the fixed 
effects model to be biased.  
In my thesis, I use three different ways to include fixed effects due to the specifications of 
various regression models. First, the simplest way is running least square dummy variable 
regression (LSDV), which can at times be heavy since it consumes many degrees of freedom. 
However, I use it in the heckman model since it is the only possible way to include the fixed 
effects. Additionally, LSDV is an easy way to control for the time fixed effects by including 
year dummies. The LSDV equation; 
                                             (3) 
in which γ is the dependent variable, x is the independent variable and D is the dummy 
variable either for time-fixed effects or for cross-sectional fixed effects, which equals one if 
the condition is met and zero otherwise. Second, in within regression average value of the 
variable is subtracted from each observation, thus eliminating all the between-subject 
variability and leaving only within-subject variability for analysis. The within equation 
iitiitiit uuxxyy  )(     (4) 
Third, there is also the possibility to use between regression, which can be run with the time-
averaged values of the variables and avoiding all the hassle of estimating variables, however 
it only allows one-way fixed effects either time- or entity-fixed effects.  
Taking first differences also eliminates the unexplained component and controls for fixed-
effects, the equation is; 
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                   (5) 
However, as the equation indicates one level of observations will be lost. All the three 
methods would yield the same coefficients and standard errors, however there are significant 
differences in degrees of freedom. I control for time-fixed effects, since I am interested in the 
changes in variables that occur through time, furthermore I do not assume that the changes 
would be the same across entities and thus, I also include entity-fixed effects such as country- 
or firm-level effect depending on the level of analysis. I ha ve employed the fixed-effects 
model in OLS regressions , tobit and logit regression. The equation for LSDV including both 
time- and entity-fixed effects, 
                                                            
                (6) 
where γ presents the dependent variable, x is dependent variable, D1i, D2i, D3i, .. , DNi is the 
entity-fixed effects and D1t, D2t, D3t, .. , DNt are the time-fixed effects. 
6.3 Logit regression 
Logit regression is a binary choice regression that estimates the likelihood of a event 
occurring. In my analysis, I use logit regression to estimate the probability of a fund being 
raised by a GP following Gompers and Lerner (1999); if a fund was raised in a given year it 
gets value 1 and if not it gets value 0.  Cumulative logistic distribution function F is used  
      
   
     
  
 
      
     (7) 
where e is the exponential under the logit approach and Z is function to be estimated. This 
implies that the fitted regression model will be S-shape instead of linear. The non-linear 
probability model estimated is 
   
 
                          
    (8) 
where again P i is the probability that yi = 1. By means of maximum likelihood estimation, the 
logit model assesses the impact of macro and micro determinants  to the likelihood of GP 
raising a fund. The coefficients reported are not probabilities but transformed logs and I will 
calculate the marginal effect at the mean value of the explanatory variables. I also report 
Huber-White robust standard errors controlled for heteroscedasticity. To estimate the 
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explanation power of the regression, I use z-statistics and pseudo-R
2
 similarly to t-statistics 
and chi
2
 probabilities. 
6.4 Tobit regression 
Tobit regression is effectively a hybrid between a standard regression model and a binary 
choice model (Dougherty, 2006). I employ tobit regression in the aggregate coutry level 
analysis, since my data omits the funds that have not been able to raise any capital and also 
funds that performed poorly and were not able to raise follow-on funds, and thus have 
dropped out of the sample. Thus, OLS would yield inconsistent estimates if used to fit the 
regression, since it fails to control for the left truncation in the sample. 
  
                                 (9) 
where yi = y*i for a*i>0 and, yi is unobserved for a*i<0 I. Tobit model is also used by Kaplan 
and Schoar (2005) for their VE data to estimate the relation between fund size and 
performance. I will use Tobit regression for total capital commitments into private equity.  
6.5 Heckman selection model 
I apply Heckman correction to estimate the relation between credit market conditions and 
fund size. Smaller funds are reporting more infrequently and inconsistently than larger funds, 
creating a selection bias could problem. Heckman (1979) invented solution to come around 
selection bias problem and control for the bias in sample selection. Heckman correction is 
applied by many recent academics (e.g. Maula et al 2013) and has firm basis in statistical 
theory to overcome the problem of poor access to the data of GPs that failed to raise a fund or 
smaller funds that report inconsistently. The model is two step procedure which involves first 
estimating the probability probit model, which is similar to logit model except it uses 
cumulative standardized normal distribution, of observation participating in a regression, 
                (10) 
where Yi=1 if the GPs have raised a fund and 0 otherwise, Zi are the macro and micro 
variables that explain the probability of a fund being raised, γ are the parameters to be 
estimated, which define the individual probability of a fund being included in the sample and 
ei is a random error term. Other way to present the model is;  
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Prob(Y=1|Z)= Φ(Zγ),     (11) 
where Y indicates a fund being raised (Y = 1 if the GP raises a fund and D = 0 otherwise), Z 
is a vector of explanatory macro and micro variables, γ is a vector of unknown parameters, 
and Φ is the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal distribution. The model 
yields an estimation of the probability a fund being included in the sample, which is denoted 
with lambda. In the second stage, I correct for self-selection by including the lambda in the 
second regression in which the dependent variable is the follow-on fund size. The fund size 
equation is, 
            (12) 
where Wi is the fund size,  Xi observed variables relating to micro and macro determinants of 
fund size and εi is an error term. W is observed fund that is included in the sample.   
60 
 
 
7 EMPIRICAL RESULTS  
7.1 Aggregate country-level results 
This section presents and discusses the results from empirical analyses that I perform to 
address the key research questions of the thesis. The results on relation between credit market 
conditions and capital commitments into buyout funds are divided into three distinctive 
sections; aggregate country-, firm- and fund-level to benefit from the two databases I obtain 
and to analyze the research questions from various perspectives. 
The country level aggregate fundraising volume is a sum product of number of funds in the 
market and the size of these funds. Market is put together of first-time fundraisers and follow-
on funds; all of which have slightly different characteristics and drivers. For example, the 
commitments into follow-on funds are affected by the performance of the firm’s previous 
funds whereas the first-time funds lack direct performance indicator , and also, the size of a 
follow-on fund greatly depends on the size of the previous fund as the follow-on funds are 
usually the same size or larger. 
First, I start my analysis at aggregate country-level with VE database which is more 
comprehensive in terms of number of funds including also smaller funds. I intend to expand 
the understanding of drivers behind the entrance of new players into the buyout industry and 
capital raised by first-time funds.  Second, I analyze the probability of a given GP raising a 
fund under loose credit conditions, and furthermore study follow-on funds by utilizing the 
Preqin database to control for the performance of GPs’ previous fund and thus eliminating the 
impact fund-level performance factors. Third, I assess the size of a follow-on fund with 
conditional selection model which takes into account the probability of the fund being raised 
and thus enables the examination of the factors more directly impacting the size of the fund. 
In the last section, I also briefly discuss the effect of credit market conditions on fund 
performance and the micro characteristics of buyout funds and compare those to the existing 
empirical evidence on venture capital funds.  
7.1.1 What drives fund commitments at aggregate country-level? 
Aggregate country-level results reported in Table 10 indicate negative relation between 
commitments to buyout funds and credit market conditions. When the spread increases, less 
capital is committed into buyout funds and when the spread decreases more capital is 
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committed. I split the analysis into capital raised in dollar value and number of funds raised; 
both analysis yield the same highly significant results that more capital is allocated to buyout 
funds and more GPs decide to raise a buyout fund when credit market conditions are loose  
measured with Moody’s BAA corporate bond spread. 
My results shown in Table 10 indicate that one percentage point decrease in the corporate 
credit spread should increase the fundraising volumes by nearly US$47 billion. This seems 
like a large increase but, when looking at the Figure 6 on page 46, the maximum annual 
variation in spread over time is 1,9% and the average annual variation in the spread is as low 
as 0.06%. Thus, one percentage variation could be considered rather large and exceptional, 
and therefore US$47 billion shift seems reasonable. My results suggest that when the spread 
changes significantly, it has a strong impact on the buyout fundraising volumes. Furthermore, 
model 3 shows that a decrease of 100 bps in the credit spread also increases the number of 
funds raised on average by 57. This compares to the average number of 169 funds raised 
annually as quite reasonable when taking into account the significant increase in number of 
funds over the time period as shown in Table 6 on page 41. 
My findings on relation between capital commitments past buyout industry returns are in-line 
with findings by Kaplan and Schoar (2005) showing a surprising negative relation. Even 
though, it initially seems counterintuitive that more commitments are made to buyout funds 
after the buyout industry has performed poorly, the data in Figure 9 on page 62 clearly 
indicates that even though the average annual return of buyout funds has declined 
dramatically, as poorer fund have entered the market and competitiveness has increased, the 
amount of money committed to buyout funds has increased significantly. My statistical 
analysis also provides significant results.  
Kaplan and Schoar (2005) find that stock market returns have a positive relation to private 
equity fundraising. My findings on buyout funds indicate that the lagged market returns seem 
to have a negative relation with the aggregate buyout capital commitments; however the 
coefficients are insignificant in my results. Their sample includes both venture capital and 
buyout funds, of which venture capital funds are over presented in the sample and thus  
probably driving the results. I test this by running a similar regression with a sample of 
venture capital funds, and indeed the coefficients are positive and significant now
37
.  
                                              
37
 I have not reported the results since the comparison between venture capital funds and buyout funds 
fundraising is not the core focus of this thesis. 
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Interestingly, the interest rate of Treasury bill has a positive effect on the aggregate 
fundraising amount, somewhat similar direction compared to findings by Gompers and Lerner 
(1999), even though insignificant. This may stem from the fact that Treasury bill’s interest 
rate has been at very low levels compared to 1980s, at around 0-4% during 2007-2011 and 
close to 14% in the early 1980s. Even after detrending the T-bill rate, the effect remains, thus 
indicating a possibility that nowadays. T-bill is more correlated to overall economic 
conditions, overheating and recessions, than considered as alternative investment choice to 
buyout funds as in the early 1980s when it offered relatively high returns. 
Figure 9 Buyout industry returns and aggregate fundraising 
The chart below represents the relation between buyout funds’ pooled net-of-fees IRR as a percentage and the 
aggregate commitments into buyout industry in US$ billion in 2011 dollars. 
 
To conclude, BAA corporate bond spread stays significant and negative in all the various 
models even after controlling for time-fixed effects and country-fixed effects, indicating that 
credit conditions indeed are a significant driver of fund commitments at aggregate level. 
However, my result is not completely robust yet, as the past literature argues that micro 
factors such as the reputation of GP and past performance drive fund commitments. My 
analysis has so far provided support that at aggregate country-level fundraising is strongly 
dependent on credit conditions, next I will analyse first-time funds more closely.  
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Table 10 Aggregate buyout fundraising at country-level 
VE sample is used with 17 European countries and US and Canada between 1980-2011. Dependent variables are 
country-level total aggregate fundraising in 2011 dollars (US$bil) and total number of funds raised within a country. 
Funds are allocated to countries according to GPs origin. Independent variables are macro-level variables. BAA 
Corporate bond spread is BAA Corporate bond return rate over risk-free rate. Risk-free rate measured as a 10-year 
Treasury bond. GDPt-1 is log return of Gross Domestic Product specific to a country with a one year lag. Market return 
is dividend adjusted log stock market return; S&P 500 for US and FTSE All Shares for Europe with a one year lag. T-
Bill is one-year Treasury bill defined by country with a one year lag. Industry IRR is the value-weighted IRR of 
previous funds; calculated by tracking previous fund of every fund in a given vintage year raised by a given firm, and 
then taking value-weighted average IRR of those funds for that particular vintage year. F.E refers to fixed effects. 
Pseudo-R2s is reported as a measure of model explanatory power. All the standard errors are robust Eicker-Huber-
White standard errors for the panel data regressions. (P-values in brackets). Where *, ** and *** denote to statistical 
significance of the relationship at 10%, 5 % and 1 % levels respectively. 
Dependent variable: Country-level total aggregate fundraising in 2011 dollars (US$bil) and total number of funds 
raised within a country 
  Capital raised   Total number of funds 
Independent variables    
∆BAA Corporate bond spread(t-1) -47.44***  -56.56*** 
 (0.00)  (0.00) 
Log change GDP(t-1) -8.07  -5.69 
 (0.55)  (0.59) 
Log market return(t-1) -74.59  -18.80 
 (0.27)  (0.73) 
Industry IRR(t-1) -0.04  -0.775** 
 (0.93)  (0.03) 
T-Bill(t-1) 4.35  0.94 
 (0.37)  (0.74) 
    
Country F.E Yes  Yes 
Year F.E Yes  Yes 
Clustered at country level Yes  Yes 
    
Pseudo - R2 0.06  0.20 
Nr of observations 495  495 
Prob > Chi2 0.00   0.00 
 
  
 
7.1.2 What drives the entry of new players into the buyout market? 
Aggregate buyout fundraising volume is dependent on the number of GPs raising a fund and the 
size of their fund. GPs can be divided into established firms and new players entering the market. 
Previous literature (Kaplan and Schoar, 2005) has indicated that capital commitments to new funds 
and existing funds could be driven by very different drivers; fund commitments to follow-on funds 
by established GPs could be driven by the performance and characteristics of their previous funds 
rather than market conditions. Next, I am going to discuss the dynamics of new market entries and 
in the following section I am going to present the results of established GPs at a firm-level since we 
need to control for fund-level factors. 
Table 11 presents the results for dollar value of capital raised by first-time buyout funds and the 
number of buyout funds raised by either new partnerships that have been set-up or by private equity 
firms which have previously been focusing in other areas e.g. venture capital, and have now decided 
to raise their first buyout fund. I include the latter because the underlying factors driving the 
investment decision is potentially similar i.e. related to the overall condition of the industry and 
opportunities available, rather than the performance of previous non-buyout funds since, for 
example, the skill-set and platform required are very different.  
The results indicate that 12 new funds are raised when credit spread decreases by 100 bps. This may 
seem like a small number but my data set includes only 500 observations over 30 years, thus 
indicating a strong statistical significance that new funds entering the market is negatively related to 
the credit market conditions. Whereas, the amount of capital raised by first-time funds has negative 
but insignificant coefficient. As the Figure 7 on page 46 indicates, the capital raised by fist-time 
funds stays at rather constant level during the time period of 1980-2012 compared to the sharp 
increase in the number of follow-on funds.  
Furthermore, the results of other variables are the same as already discussed above with total capital 
and total number of funds; stock market return and growth in GDP indicates negative, however 
insignificant relation with capital commitments and number of new funds, what is contradictory to 
the findings by Kaplan and Schoar (2005), however this might be due to venture capital fund driven 
sample. My result on buyout industry return is line with them. They report that current and lagged 
negative buyout industry return leads to more commitments and more funds being raised, but as 
discussed above the returns from buyout funds have dropped tremendously, while the amount of 
money committed to buyout funds has increased sharply. 
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Table 11 New entries into buyout industry 
VE sample is used with 17 European countries and US and Canada between 1980-2011. Dependent variables are 
capital raised by new buyout funds in 2011 dollars (US$bil) and number of new buyout funds raised within a country. 
Funds are allocated to countries according to GPs origin. Independent variables are macro-level variables. BAA 
Corporate bond spread is BAA Corporate bond return rate over risk-free rate. Risk-free rate measured as a 10-year 
Treasury bond. GDPt-1 is log return of Gross Domestic Product specific to a country with a one year lag. Market return 
is dividend adjusted log stock market return; S&P 500 for US and FTSE All Shares for Europe with a one year lag. T-
Bill is one-year Treasury bill defined by country with a one year lag. Industry IRR is the value-weighted IRR of 
previous funds; calculated by tracking previous fund of every fund in a given vintage year raised by a given firm, and 
then taking value-weighted average IRR of those funds for that particular vintage year. F.E refers to fixed effects. 
Pseudo-R2s is reported as a measure of model explanatory power. All the standard errors are robust Eicker-Huber-
White standard errors for the panel data regressions. (P-values in brackets). Where *, ** and *** denote to statistical 
significance of the relationship at 10%, 5 % and 1 % levels respectively. 
Dependent variable: Capital raised by new buyout funds in 2011 dollars ($bil) and number of new buyout funds raised 
within a country 
  
Capital raised by new 
funds 
  
Number of new GP 
entrants 
Independent variables    
∆BAA Corporate bond spread (t-1) -1.61  -12.04*** 
 (0.25)  (0.00) 
Log change GDP(t-1) -0.93  -2.30 
 (0.56)  (0.44) 
Log market return(t-1) -0.41  15.70 
 (0.96)  (0.34) 
Industry IRR -0.03  -0.24** 
 (0.50)  (0.03) 
T-Bill(t-1) 0.48  2.82*** 
 (0.22)  (0.00) 
    
Country F.E Yes  Yes 
Year F.E Yes  Yes 
Clustered at country level Yes  Yes 
    
Pseudo - R2 0.06  0.31 
Nr of observations 495  495 
Prob > Chi2 0.00   0.00 
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7.2 Firm-level results 
As the prior literature indicates the capital commitments into a particular firm are strongly 
dependent on the past performance of the previous funds. Investors are expecting that the returns 
persist for a particular GP. Therefore, omitting the performance of previous fund from the 
regression may lead to biased coefficients and invalid standard errors. To make sure the robustness 
of my results, I control fund specific characters at firm-level. Following Gompers and Lerner 
(1999), I control for years since the last fund was raised, age of the firm
38
 and performance of 
previous fund measured with IRR. I follow the methodology by Gompers and Lerner (1999), by 
assigning 1 for a year in which the firm raised a buyout fund and zero for years in which no fund 
was raised. This regression also overcomes the problem of selection bias in my sample, since I 
apply the assumption that a fund could have been raised in any given year. Additionally, while 
controlling for fund-level factors that contribute to the success of raising a fund, the timing of 
fundraising should be explained by macro-level factors and I expect to find that credit market 
conditions are a major drivers of fund commitments. 
I study the factors that have an impact on the probability of raising a fund with two time periods; 
with total sample and then I limit the sample to 1994-2011, since the private equity market in many 
countries started to develop in the early 1990s due to regulatory changes as discussed above. Many 
of the countries prior to 1994 had infrequent fundraising; almost non-existent compared to the 
current fundraising levels, except for US.  
7.2.1 What factors increase the probability of raising a fund at firm-level? 
The probability of a GP raising a fund increases when BAA corporate bond spread decreases. I also 
find that across time series credit conditions has higher economic impact on probability of capital 
committed into buyout funds than cross-sectional
39
. These results remain highly significant also 
after controlling for the fund specific factors, as shown in the model 1 of Table 12 on page 69. I find 
that 100 basis points decrease in the credit spread increases the probability for a particular PE firm 
raising a buyout fund by 5.3% without controlling for the firm-fixed effects and analysis indicate 
that credit spread contributes only 1.38%. 
                                              
38
 I run the regression with both the age of the firm and with the years of specific experience in buyout industry, as a 
proxy for skill and reputation in the particular field. The results from the two slightly different proxies are not 
statistically different. 
39
 Cross sectional analysis means that the model is controlled for the firm-fixed effects, but not for time series; meaning 
that it controls for firm-specific issues but not time specific. 
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The sample size for European buyout funds is not sufficiently
40
 large to control both the 
performance of previous fund and the firm fixed effects in the same model, thus I run the analysis 
with US sample solely in model 5. The results still hold and are very much significant; however the 
economic significance has diminished slightly, also because we are consuming many degrees of 
freedom. A 100 basis points increase in credit spread leads to a 0,54% increase in the probability of 
a fund being raised by a given GP and 1,38% increase when time period is limited to more recent 
period of 1994-2011. 
In model 3, following the example of Gompers and Lerner (1999) and Kaplan and Schoar (2005), I 
add a square term of micro-level factors that should even further emphasize the effect of fund 
specific factors and additionally, help me to study the functional form of the micro factors’ relation. 
In the first two models which include the first-time funds, the coefficient for years since previous 
was raised is positive and significant, indicating that the probability of fund being raised increases 
when time passes. However, for models with only follow-on funds time passing reduces the 
probability after long enough time period. The squared term in model 3 is negative and significant 
indicating a concave relation between the probability of raising a fund and time-passing after 
previous fund was raised; meaning that at first the time-passing increases the probability of raising a 
follow-on fund, however after long enough time period has passed the relation turns to negative and 
additional year passing decreases the probability. The same concave relation applies for GPs 
experience in the buyout industry. The more the GP has experience the more likely it is that they 
will raise a fund, however it seems that the squared term is negative however insignificant, possibly 
indicating that after a certain level of experience in the industry an additional marginal increase in 
experience would not increase the probability of raising a fund, and thus the relation turns to flat. 
My results with buyout fund sample are in line with findings on venture capital funds by Kaplan 
and Schoar (2005).  
In model 4, I include T-bill return and change in pension levels as in the aggregate-level regression. 
As it was obvious on the page 69, the T-Bill and pension levels fail to explain the fund 
commitments. T-Bill obtains opposite sign to expectations; possible explanation being that T-bill 
rate of return could more be reflecting the condition of economy than presenting an alternative 
investment choice to buyout funds as argued by Gompers and Lerner (1999). In model 4, I test the 
effect of pension levels within a country; the coefficient is positive however insignificant. I only 
                                              
40
 Models 1 and 2 allow controlling for firm-fixed effects, since in these regressions I do not control for the performance 
of the previous fund, unlike in models 3 and 4, in which the number of observations per GP drops below 10, meaning 
that logit regression does not reach convergence and thus it is statistically impossible to include firm-fixed effects. 
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obtain pension fund levels from 2003 to 2011, thus the number of observations reduces by 400 to 
4,393 and time period shortens significantly; however all the other variables maintain their 
coefficients. Furthermore in model 4, I include the IRR difference to benchmark variable , which 
controls for buyout industry returns. The industry return that I observe is the aggregate return for 
the total buyout market. However, Preqin conducts more specific comparison and compares the 
fund performance to other funds with same vintage year and geographical focus. Thus, the IRR 
difference to benchmark is more accurate measure of the industry returns relative to comparable 
peers. While the industry benchmark variable is positive and significant, also the BAA corporate 
bond spread remains negative and significant. Also, the market returns are now positive and 
significant, and in-line with prior literature. The coefficients of GDP growth and market 
capitalization
41
 are also positive, even though weakly significant.  
 
  
                                              
41
 Market return and market capitalization have high correlation, thus they cannot be included in the same regression. I 
obtain no significantly different results, and thus I do not report the regression with market capitalization variable. 
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Table 12 Probability of raising a fund at GP level 
Preqin sample with 18 European countries and US and Canada. Models 1-5 are binary logit fixed effects regressions with 
different variable specifications. Model 1 includes the total sample period from 1980-2011. Models 2-4 include shorter period 
of 1994-2011 as robustness check of results and model 5 includes only US sample. The dependent variable is a binary 
variable, which obtains value of 1 when fund raised and 0 if no fund was raised during that particular year. The independent 
variables are macro-level variables and I also include set of control variables at fund-level. BAA Corporate bond spread is 
BAA Corporate bond return rate over risk-free rate. Risk-free rate is measured as 10y Treasury bond. US high yield is US 
high yield corporate bond return over risk-free rate. GDP(t-1) is log return of Gross Domestic Product specified by country 
with a one year lag. Market return is dividend adjusted log stock market return; S&P 500 for US and FTSE All Shares for 
Europe with a one year lag. T-Bill is one-year Treasury bill defined by country with a one year lag. Industry IRR is "value-
weighted IRR of previous funds"; calculated by tracking previous fund of every fund in a given vintage y ear raised by a 
given firm, and then taking value-weighted average IRR of those funds for that particular vintage year. Pension levels is the 
log change in pension levels (defined as pension liabilities) in a country -level with a one year lag. Fund level control 
variables include years since previous fund was raised and a square of years since previous fund was raised for a particular 
GP. Experience in buyout is defined as years since the first buyout fund was raised. IRR of previous year is the net of fees 
IRR% that Preqin reports for every fund. IRR difference to benchmark is the difference between fund's net of fees IRR% to 
equivalent market benchmark according to geographic focus and vintage year. F.E is fixed effects. Clustering refers to 
clustering of standard errors. Pseuro-R is represented and Prob > Chi2 is a test with a null hypotheses that all the coefficients 
are zero. All the standard errors are robust Eicker-Huber-White standard errors for the panel data regressions. Where *, ** 
and *** denote to statistical significance of the relationship at 10%, 5 % and 1 % levels respectively. Pseudo-R2 and LR 
statistic are reported as measures of model explanatory power. (P-values in brackets). 
Dependent variable: Binary variable Raised a fund (1 if yes, 0 if no)     
  1980-2011   1994-2011   US sample 
Independent variables Model 1   Model 2 Model 3 Model 4   Model 5 
        
∆BAA corporate bond spread(t-1) -2.36***  -1.92*** -0.28** -0.84***  -0.22* 
 (0.00)  (0.00) (0.05) (0.00)  (0.10) 
Log Change GDP(t-1) 0.06  1.22 1.95* 0.77  -1.38 
 (0.93)  (0.21) (0.06) (0.57)  (0.77) 
Log Market return(t-1) 1.74**  2.78* 2.99** 0.78  0.69** 
 (0.01)  (0.06) (0.03) (0.24)  (0.03) 
Industry IRR(t-1) -0.03***  0.01  -0.03  -0.07*** 
 (0.00)  (0.41)  (0.12)  (0.00) 
T-Bill(t-1) -0.53***    0.29*   
 (0.00)    (0.06)   
Log change pension levels(t-1)     0.18   
     (0.70)   
Fund-level control variable:        
Years since previous fund raised 0.09***  0.09*** 0.97*** -0.59***  0.51*** 
 (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) 
Experience in buyout industry -0.39***  -2.91*** 0.08*** 0.04***  -0.09*** 
 (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) 
Square years since previous fund raised    -0.09***    
    (0.00)    
Square experience in BO industry    -0.001    
    (0.18)    
IRR of previous fund    0.02*** 0.01***  0.01 
    (0.00) (0.00)  (0.11) 
IRR difference to benchmark    0.01***    
    (0.00)    
Firm F.E Yes  Yes No No  Yes 
Year F.E Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
        
Nr of observations 14526  8028 4851 4393  2508 
Prob > Chi2 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 
Pseudo R2       0.06 0.06     
  
 
7.3 Fund-level results 
First, I show support that decrease in credit spread leads to a significant increase in the fund size.  
Second, my results show that fund raised during tight credit market conditions are more likely to 
raise a follow-on fund. This indicates that performance of funds which are raised during tight credit 
conditions is better than funds raised during loose credit conditions when credit is easily available . 
Third, I follow Kaplan and Schoar (2005) study on the micro-level factors affecting performance of 
buyout funds. Kaplan and Schoar (2005) sample includes 80% of venture capital funds and only 
20% of buyout funds. I will be running analysis with a buyout fund sample and comparing my 
results to the past literature on venture capital funds, concluding that the performance characteristics 
of venture capital and buyout funds are very similar. 
7.3.1 Fund size 
The fund size depends among other factors on geographical region and industry focus, i.e. Nordic 
funds focusing on small-mid markets raise significantly smaller funds than GPs in US focusing on 
much larger markets. Therefore, to assure the robustness of my results, I control for the size of the 
previous fund which should take into account the strategy choice and preference for certain type of 
funds. 
My findings on Table 13 on page 72 show that GPs increase significantly the size of a buyout fund 
following a period of loose credit market conditions due to potentially larger number of attractive 
investment opportunities and better access to transaction financing. One unit, 100 basis points, 
increase in the credit spread increases the fund size by 17% which indicates significant growth even 
after controlling for fund-level factors. The observation from buyout market indicates that usually 
follow-on funds are twice as large as the previous fund. Thus, 17% increase in the fund size sounds 
reasonable.  
For the fund size analysis, I use the conditional probability regression; heckman two-step model. 
The first regression estimates the probability of a fund being included in the sample and second 
regression, step-two, estimates the effect of various determinants on the size of a fund. The first 
regression is similar to that of the model 4 in   
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Table 12 on page 69, however I exclude the IRR of a previous fund since otherwise all the first-time 
funds would be excluded from the sample. The downside of heckman model is that fixed-effects 
cannot be included; thus I include year dummies to control for time variation. For the second 
regression, I include the same control variables as Gompers and Lerner (1999) and Kaplan and 
Schoar (2005); credit market condition being a new variable , since the relation has not been studied 
before.  
The findings on control variables are in line with Kaplan and Schoar (2005), but differ from 
Gompers and Lerner (1999) who run their analysis with venture capital funds. My sample includes 
684 buyout funds while Kaplan and Schoar (2005) include 169 buyout funds in their analysis with 
tobit regression and Gompers and Lerner (1999) include 1,117 venture capital funds in their study 
with heckman model. Macro-level variables are significant and have opposite signs, additionally 
also fund-level results differ except for experience in buyout industry. My results differ from 
Gompers and Lerner (1999) since I employ different set of funds and time frame. Kaplan and 
Schoar (2005) have results more in line with mine. The size of previous fund is positively and 
significantly related to the size of the next fund, sequence of fund is positive however insignificant 
in both cases and better previous performance leads to larger follow-on funds being raised.   
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Table 13 The size of a follow-on fund 
Preqin sample with 18 European countries and US and Canada between 1994-2012. Heckman selection model with binary 
dependent variable which obtains value of 1 when fund raised and 0 if no fund was raised during that particular year. The 
independent variables are macro-level variables and I also include set of control variables at fund-level. BAA Corporate bond 
spread is BAA Corporate bond return rate over risk-free rate. Risk-free rate measured as 10y Treasury bond. GDP(t-1) is log 
return of Gross Domestic Product specified by country with a one year lag. Market return is dividend adjusted log stock 
market return; S&P 500 for US and FTSE All Shares for Europe with a one year lag. T-Bill is one-year Treasury bill defined 
by country with a one year lag. Industry IRR is  "value-weighted IRR of previous funds"; calculated by tracking previous fund 
of every fund in a given vintage year raised by a given firm, and then taking value-weighted average IRR of those funds for 
that particular vintage year. Fund level control variables include years since previous fund was raised and a square of years 
since previous fund was raised for a particular GP. Experience in BO is defined as years since the first buyout fund was 
raised. IRR of previous year is the net of fees IRR% that Preqin reports for every fund. IRR difference to benchmark is the 
difference between fund's net of fees IRR% to equivalent market benchmark according to geographic focus and vintage year. 
F.E is fixed effects. Clustering refers to clustering of standard errors. Pseuto-R is represented and Prob > Chi2 is a test with a 
null hypotheses that all the coefficients are zero. All the standard errors are robust Eicker-Huber-White standard errors for the 
panel data regressions (P-values in brackets). Where *, ** and *** denote to statistical significance of the relationship at 10%, 5 
% and 1 % levels respectively. 
Dependent variable: Binary variable raised a fund (1 if yes, 0 if no) if yes then OLS regression of size of fund 
    
 Independent variables Was a fund raised? If Yes, logarithm of a fund size 
(US$2011s) 
∆BAA Corporate bond spread (t-1) -0.11** -0.17*** 
 (0.03) (0.01) 
Log change GDP(t-1) 1.34***  
 (0.00)  
Log market return(t-1) 0.15 0.37** 
 (0.22) (0.03) 
Industry IRR -0.01***  
 (0.00)  
T-Bill(t-1) 0.05***  
 (0.00)  
Fund level control variables    
Log fund size(t-1)   0.67*** 
   (0.00) 
Log sequence   0.07 
   (0.13) 
Years since previous fund raised 0.00  
 (0.69)  
Experience in BO industry 0.06***  
 (0.00)  
IRR of previous fund   0.003** 
   (0.04) 
    
Lambda   0.01 
    
Firm F.E No No 
Year F.E Yes No 
    
Nr of observations 8,583 684 
Prob > Chi2  0.00 0.00 
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7.3.2 What factors increase the probability of raising a follow-on fund? 
Tight credit markets lead to a higher likelihood of raising a follow-on fund. Table 14 presents the 
results of a logit regression on the probability that an established GP raises a follow-on fund. In 
order to assure the unbiasness of results, I exclude recently raised funds and obtain data with 
vintage years 1980-2007. My results indicate that loose credit markets lead to a lower probability of 
raising a follow-on which is in-line with Axelson et al (2010) who also states that loose credit 
market conditions encourage to a misuse of debt which explains the poorer fund returns. Axelson et 
al (2010) take their analysis down to transaction level and thus, they are able to show support for 
GP-LP agency conflict theory. 
I use Preqin and also VE sample due to its large amount of observations, but since VE data does not 
include fund return figures, I am using a proxy for performance metric based on Kaplan and Schoar 
(2005), who find that the ability to raise a follow-on fund is a rough proxy for a good fund 
performance. As we see from Table 14 on page 74 the results are very similar with both data sets. 
The only major difference is with sample of only follow-on funds; the coefficient for credit market 
conditions is negative and insignificant for VE sample and positive and significant for Preqin. There 
are two good explanations for this. First, VE sample includes many smaller funds as well which 
may not use as much leverage in smaller transactions. Second, as VE sample is more 
comprehensive; it could indicate that follow-on funds are already more dependent on the returns of 
the previous fund, however, I test this in Model 6 with Preqin data and find it un-true. I control for 
the performance of previous fund and get a positive and significant coefficient for credit spread. 
On a fund-level, the likelihood of raising a follow-on fund increases with the experience of the PE 
firm, fund size
42
 and good performance, which is in line with previous literature. However market 
return coefficients yield different coefficients compared to prior literature. I include three different 
market return variables; (1) at the time when the fund is closed, (2) at the time of fundraising and 
(3) three years after the fund was closed, following Kaplan and Schoar (2005). Kaplan and Schoar 
(2005) find that GPs that enter the market in boom times are less likely to raise a follow-on fund. 
However, the likelihood of being able to raise a follow-on fund, improves significantly if the market 
returns are positive 3 years after the initial funds were raised. My results on market returns obtain 
opposite and insignificant signs. As mentioned above, I believe this is because stock market returns 
are not a significant driver for buyout funds as it is for venture capital funds.
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 Fund size has a positive coefficient for VE sample, however the coefficient for Preqin sample is negative and 
insignificant. This could be because Preqin sample excludes smaller funds.  
  
 
Table 14 Probability of raising a follow-on fund 
The regressions below are logit regressions of the likelihood that an existing fund raises a follow-on fund. Panel A includes all funds and Panel B only follow-on funds excluding the 
first-time funds. The dependent variable is a dummy equal to 1 if a fund raises a next fund and 0 otherwise. The regression includes macro variables and control variables at fund-level. 
The macro variables are BAA Corporate bond spread is BAA Corporate bond return rate over risk-free rate. Risk-free rate is measured as 10y Treasury bond. GDP(t-1) is log return of 
Gross Domestic Product specified by country with a one year lag. Market return is dividend adjusted log stock market return; S&P 500 for US and FTSE All Shares for Europe with a 
one year lag. Market capitalization is unadjusted log stock market return; S&P 500 for US and FTSE All Shares for Europe with a one year lag and with an indicator of market 
conditions three years after the fund was raised. Fund-level variables are log of sequence, which is indicates the sequential order of the fund raised. Buyout sequence is the rank of 
buyout funds raised by a given GP. Fund size is log of fund size in US$mil in 2011 dollars. IRR is the net pooled IRR % of current fund and previous IRR is the net -pooled IRR% of 
the previous fund by the same GP.  F.E is fixed effects. Clustering refers to clustering of standard errors. Pseuro-R is represented and Prob > Chi2 is a test with a null hypotheses that 
all the coefficients are zero. All the standard errors are robust Eicker-Huber-White standard errors for the panel data regressions. (P-values in brackets). Where *, ** and *** denote to 
statistical significance of the relationship at 10%, 5 % and 1 % levels respectively. 
Dependent variable: Binary variable if follow-on BO fund was raised (if yes 1, otherwise 0)    
Independent variables Panel A: All funds   Panel B: Follow-on funds only 
 VE sample   Preqin sample  VE sample    Preqin sample 
  Model 1   Model 2 Model 3   Model 4   Model 5 Model 6 
∆BAA Corporate bond spread(t-1) 0.45***  1.27* 6.47***  -0.21  2.13*** 2.43*** 
 (0.00)  (0.09) (0.00)  (0.76)  (0.00) (0.00) 
Log market return T=0 1.01***  5.77** 7.09*  0.21  6.68*** 1.19 
 (0.00)  (0.05) (0.05)  0.80  (0.01) (0.30) 
Log market return T-1 1.67***  2.41 -3.00  0.05  1.93 -1.05 
 (0.00)  (0.27) (0.24)  0.97  (0.32) (0.48) 
Log market return T+3 0.11  -0.75 4.57  0.27  2.06 -0.51 
 (0.61)  (0.83) (0.17)  0.73  (0.39) (0.24) 
Log change GDP (t -1) 9.33**     21.30    
 (0.02)     (0.34)    
Log buyout fund sequence  1.01***  0.92*** 1.12***  1.20***  2.85*** 1.13*** 
 (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) 
Log fund size  0.133***  0.10 -0.17  0.08**  -0.03 -0.20* 
 (0.00)  (0.25) (0.15)  (0.04)  (0.86) (0.10) 
Fund IRR   0.08***     0.06***  
   (0.00)     (0.00)  
Previous IRR    0.06***     0.07*** 
    (0.00)     (0.00) 
Firm F.E No  No No  No  No No 
Year F.E Yes  Yes Yes  Yes  Yes Yes 
          
R2 0.11  0.24 0.23  0.12  0.18 0.19 
Nr of observations 2 561  917 584  1 324  546 584 
Prob > Chi2 0.00   0.00 0.00   0.00   0.00 0.00 
  
 
7.3.3 What fund-level factors affect the performance of buyout funds? 
My results are in-line with Kaplan and Schoar (2005) that larger buyout funds earn lower returns. 
This outcome holds both at aggregate industry level and after I control for firm fixed effects; larger 
funds earn lower returns in general and a given GP earns lower returns when raising larger funds, 
respectively. The relation between fund sequence number and returns is weaker and more 
ambiguous
43
; at industry level the relation is positive, but for a given GP it is negative, indicating 
that at industry level the performance persist when raising subsequent funds, however after 
controlling for firm-fixed effects it is no longer true.  
Next, I add square terms for both s ize and sequence in order to study the functional form of the 
relation. In model 2, I study the cross-sectional relationship (without controlling for firm fixed 
effects). Ln(size) variable has negative coefficient indicating that larger funds earn lower returns, 
however the relationship is convex (actually more like a J-shape); large enough funds experience 
higher returns. In model 4 which controls for firm-fixed effects, the coefficient for ln(size) turns 
positive and the squared term is negative indicating concave relationship between fund size and 
performance; GP earns larger returns with larger funds, however the effects diminishes away at 
very large fund size. This is in line with Kaplan and Schoar (2005).  
I conduct the same analysis for the fund sequence variable. Cross-sectional regression (without 
controlling for firm fixed effects) indicates that funds with higher sequence number earn higher 
returns, however the opposite is true for individual GPs; a given GP raising a subsequent fund will 
experience lower returns. The functional form of the relationship between the sequence and 
performance is convex both at cross-sectional level and after controlling for firm-fixed effects, 
which is also highly significant and also the coefficient increases significantly indicating a strong 
relation. 
Next, in models 5 and 6 I find highly significant results that performance persist in subsequent 
buyout funds as the prior literature has indicated. However, here as well the market returns yield a 
result opposite to the one by venture capital funds, namely at a significant level higher market 
returns lead to a poorer fund performance. Furthermore, models 7 and 8 present the results of credit 
market conditions and fund performance. The results are insignificant but negative on industry level 
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 It is diffi cult to draw any conclusions from the relation between sequence and performance, since my sequence sample is inadequate; I only obtain 
more than 10 funds for sequences 1,2,3,4 namely 186, 75, 32, 12 respectively, thus not able to study sequences beyond 4. 
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and weakly significant and negative after controlling for firm-fixed effects indicating that loose 
credit market conditions lead to higher fund performance.  
Table 15 Fund-level characteristics and performance of the fund 
 
IRR after 5 years of existence, sample includes funds1980-2007. OLS firm-fixed effects with year dummies and robust ; ln(size) is a 
logarithm of fund size, ln(size) is logarithm of fund size to power of 2, ln(sequence) is a logarithm of fund’s sequence number, and 
ln(Sequence)^2 is the same to power of 2, IRR (t -1) is the return of previous fund, IRR(t -2) is the return of a fund before the previous 
fund, market return (t=0) is the market return at the time of raising the fund.  Model 1: Studies at industry level and not controlling for 
firm fixed effects. Model 2: Studies at industry level and without controlling fixed effects the concave vs convex behavior of size and 
sequence to fund performance. Model 3: Is the same model as model 1 but it controls for GP specific characteristics. Model 4: Is the 
same as model 2, but it  controls for firm fixed effects and thus the concave vs convex behavior implies to a particular GP. Model 5: 
Persistence of buyout fund returns. Model 6: Persistence of returns and market returns at the time of raising a fund. Pseudo-R is 
represented and Prob > Chi2 is a test with a null hypotheses that all the coefficients are zero. All the standard errors are robust 
Eicker-Huber-White standard errors for the panel data regressions. (P-values in brackets).  Where *, ** and *** denote to 
statistical significance of the relationship at 10%, 5 % and 1 % levels respectively. 
  Dependent variable: Realised net-of-fees IRR% at fund-level          
Independent variables            
 Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5  Model 6     
ln(Size) -0.02***  -0.14***  -0.04  0.02       
 (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.13)  (0.83)       
ln(Size)^2   0.004***    -0.01       
   (0.01)    (0.37)       
ln(Sequence) 0.001  -0.11  -0.05  -0.18**       
 (0.41)  (0.27)  (0.21)  (0.03)       
ln(Sequence)^2   0.07    0.10*       
   (0.31)    (0.07)       
IRR t-1         0.01***  0.01***   
         (0.00)  (0.00)   
IRR t-2         0.00  0.00   
         (0.88)  (0.88)   
Market return (T=0)           -0.30**   
           (0.03)   
              
Firm F.E No  No  Yes  Yes  No  No   
Year F.E Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  No  No   
              
R2 overall 0.18  0.20  0.05  0.05  0.33  0.25   
Within     0.35  0.38       
Between     0.01  0.01       
Nr of observations 284  284  284  284  61  61   
Prob > Chi2         0.02   0.01             
   
  
 
8 CONCLUSIONS  
The purpose of this thesis is to address the lack of understanding of drivers behind capital 
commitments into buyout funds. According to my knowledge, this is one of the first studies to 
solely focus on drivers of buyout fundraising and moreover the first to show that capital 
commitments into buyout funds are driven by credit market conditions; when credit market 
conditions are loose more funds are raised and more money is committed to a particular fund. 
I obtain a comprehensive sample of European and North American buyout funds from two different 
sources. Through Thomson VentureXpert (VE), I access the information of 5,420 buyout funds 
raised during 1980-2011 and from Preqin, I obtain the data of 1,273 buyout funds. VE is widely 
used among academics and thus a reliable source for an aggregate country and a firm level analysis. 
Preqin is a fairly new database and employed only by the most recent studies, thus giving an access 
to recent source of data for a fund-level analysis.  
My first hypothesis is fully accepted with supportive results at country, firm and fund level. The 
aggregate country level results indicate that a 100 basis points decrease in the credit spread leads to 
an US$ 47billion increase in commitments to buyout funds across the industry in the following 
year. The significant increase in commitments is due to two key drivers; established GPs raising 
larger follow-on funds and more first time funds entering the buyout industry. A 100bps decrease in 
the credit spread increases the number of first-time buyout funds entering the market by 12
44
 the 
next year. The size of a follow-on fund raised by an established private equity firm increases by 
17% when the credit spread decreases by 100bps. 
Also the firm level results bring support to my first hypothesis; the probability of a PE firm raising 
a follow-on fund is affected by the prevailing credit market conditions. However, even though the 
results are statistically significant at the 1% level, the economic significance is small. A decrease of 
100bps in the credit spread increases the probability of a fund being raised by 5.3% across the 
industry
45
, and after controlling for fund level factors such as the performance of previous fund, the 
probability diminishes to 1.4% but still remains statistically significant at the 1% level.  
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 12 might seem like a small number, but my sample includes 500 first-time funds over 30 years thus 12 is statistically 
significant result at 1% level. 
45
 Across the industry means excluding firm and previous fund level factors, thus also includes first time funds. 
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My second hypothesis suggests that economy-wide debt market conditions should explain 
commitments into buyout funds better than cross-sectional GP characteristics; meaning that when 
credit conditions are loose more GPs will be raising funds despite their firm specific characteristics, 
such as poor performance of a previous fund.  This is partly true as discussed above , a 100bps 
decrease in the credit spread results in a 5.3% increase in the probability of a fund being raised, 
however when we take GP’s characteristics into account this diminishes to 1.4%. Showing that after 
we control for GP’s characteristics the impact becomes less effective, however loose credit markets 
still positively impacts the probability. The results remain statistically significant at the 1% 
significance level indicating that there is indeed a relation between the probability of a fund being 
raised and the credit market conditions, but economically the results are rather meaningless.  
My third hypothesis studies the choice to establish a  private equity firm from macro-economic 
perspective. Compared to the prior literature by Kaplan and Schoar (2005), it seems that my results 
for buyout funds differ from general private equity funds – market returns affect neither the number 
nor size of new entrants, however indeed it seems that the number of new entrants grows when the 
credit markets are loose; although the size of buyout funds is still not impacted. Moreover, the size 
of first-time buyout funds stays more or less constant over the period between 1980 and 2011. This 
is a different characteristic from venture capital funds , which have increased significantly over time. 
Although, my thesis does not go in depth on how the credit conditions affect the performance of a 
fund, I do test the matter briefly in order to find out more about the economic implications of my 
research. My results show that funds that are initially raised and invested during the times of loose 
credit market conditions have a lower probability of raising follow-on funds, thus indicating poorer 
results. This is also in-line with findings from Axelson et al (2010), who also state that the reason 
behind this is that loose credit market conditions encourage to a misuse of debt which leads to 
poorer fund returns.  
Finally, I end my study by comparing the performance characteristics of buyout funds to the 
existing literature on venture capital funds. I conclude that even though the macro-economic 
determinants of capital commitments into buyout funds differ from venture capital funds, the micro-
level factors of fund performance behave similarly; across buyout and venture capital industries 
larger funds earn lower returns, however a particular GP earns larger returns with larger funds , with 
the effect diminishing at very large fund sizes. 
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Table 16 Summary of hypotheses 
 
The purpose of this research paper is to explore and deepen the understanding of US$165billion 
cash flows that are committed into buyout funds every year
46
, and to show that capital allocations 
into funds are not only driven by investors’ perception of the PE firms’ quality but also that 
macroeconomic factors play a significant role. The findings of this paper show that buyout funds 
differentiate from venture capital funds, and buyout funds’ capital ra ising is mainly driven by credit 
market conditions; when money is loose, more money is invested into buyout funds.  
For the purpose of future research, buyout funds offer an interesting topic due to  a lack of previous 
studies (except for the numerous studies on buyout fund performances). Especially, now that buyout 
funds are becoming more popular and are raised across many countries, the topic becomes more 
feasible as a research topic. Further research could be done around the sector focus of funds; why is 
capital committed to PE funds with a particular industry focus and what is this driven by? Are PE 
firms are able to pick the hot industries before it becomes hot and able to make good returns out of 
it?  
Furthermore, as said “buyout waves” have not been studied before, so one could question my 
research whether loose credit markets really drive the capital commitments into buyout funds or 
whether the liquidity in the markets just offers the means for it, but actually the broader country-
wide “buyout waves” are triggered by industry shocks as neoclassical theory and Harford (2005) 
suggests. Also, an interesting topic would be to study the investing behavior and how the capital is 
allocated between different asset classes such as private equity funds, ETFs, commodities, stock and 
bonds at different times and whether some new asset classes have become substitutes for the old 
ones.   
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 The sum varies every year and £165billion is as of 2011.  
 Macro determinants of buyout fundraising volume Accepted / Rejected 
H1 
More capital is committed into buyout funds when the credit markets are 
loose 
Accepted and 
economically strong 
H2 
Loose credit conditions should lead to more commitments into buyout 
funds despite the firm specific characteristics 
Accepted and 
economically weak 
H3 New entrants are pro-cyclical Partly accepted 
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